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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will focus on analyzing the challenges of the Albanian intelligence 
services during the implementation of the Security Sector Reform. What is the progress 
made in addressing these challenges and what are the problems still remaining? Which 
are the challenges that these services should face during the second phase, the 
consolidation of the SSR reform in the process of integration in EU and NATO? 
Albania as a new democratic society should not wait for better conditions to 
vigorously consolidate the reform of the intelligence services and the system for 
controlling, directing and coordinating these services. The intelligence structure reform 
would reflect NATOs and EUs norms, the western standards of transparency and 
accountability in a modern democracy, but also the efforts of the intelligence and security 
domain for combating new threats. The reform will improve the mechanisms of 
accountability and control, as well as legislative and judicial oversight over intelligence and 
security services working under the rule of law, and accelerate the process of integration in 
NATO and EU. In this difficult work and without a clear scheme as how to do it, the 
experience of the other states that have achieved this objective is useful. 
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After more than seventeen years since the fall of the Soviet Union, it is obvious 
that different Eastern European countries have moved in a number of directions.  Unlike 
the other Central and East European countries (CEECs) that now are part of the European 
Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western Balkans 
countries, Albania in particular, have not yet reached the same objectives.  The path to 
democracy and integration has turned out to be more complicated than expected.  At 
times, it appeared as though Albanians had overcome many difficulties and were 
progressively building new a democratic state and democratic institutions.  Soon after 
that, however, everything seemed to collapse into armed conflict, terrorist threats, 
organized crime, corruption which were the new challenges to national security.  The 
main objective of this thesis is to address two questions:  first, what are the challenges 
facing the intelligence services in their process of adhering to democratic standards; and, 
second, how can the transformation into more democratic, professional and effective 
services improve the performance of their mission and duties while accelerating the 
process of Albania’s integration into NATO and the EU. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War, the main 
challenges facing Eastern and Central Europe, as well as US and European policies 
toward these areas, have been achieving peace and stability, building democracy, 
accomplishing economic and institutional reform, accelerating growth and 
 2
modernization, and the integration of these countries into the EU and NATO.1  For most 
of the CEECs, the need to satisfy the challenging conditions to earn membership into the 
European Community and NATO has acted as an “anchor” of democratization and other 
reforms.2 The prospect of EU accession influenced virtually every aspect of post-
Communist change in the candidate countries.  Intelligence reform is one of the many 
issues faced by the former communist countries of East Europe.  New threats such as 
terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as traditional threats 
like corruption and strategic crime,3 have emerged as the top priorities to be addressed on 
the intelligence capabilities of the newly democratic governments.  The case of Albania, 
as one of the newest democracies, coming to terms with the old regime and its 
authoritarian institutions makes intelligence reform that much more difficult.   
Albania holds a special place in the history of relationships between NATO and 
former-Eastern Bloc nations; in December 1992 it became the first ex-Communist 
country to publicly announce its desire to join the Alliance.  In beginning of 1994, 
Albania endorsed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) concept and became one of the first 
countries to sign the PfP document with the implementation of the Membership Action 
Plan (MAP).4  In a similar vein, on June 12, 2006 Albania signed the Stabilization and 
                                                 
1 See the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe which was adopted in Cologne on 10 June 1999. In 
the founding document, more than 40 partner countries and organizations undertook to strengthen the 
countries of Southeastern Europe "in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and 
economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region". Euro-Atlantic integration was 
promised to all the countries in the region. At a summit meeting in Sarajevo on 30 July 1999, the Pact was 
reaffirmed. The Stability Pact Partners are the SEE countries: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro; the European Union Member States 
and the European Commission, non EU-members of the G8: USA, Canada, Japan and Russia; other 
countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, and 
Turkey; International organizations such as UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, UNHCR, NATO, OECD; 
International financial institutions such as World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB); Regional initiatives such as Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Central 
European Initiative (CEI), Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and Southeast Europe 
Cooperation Process (SEECP). 
2 Balkans: Region Awaits Clear Signal From EU, NATO.  RadioFreeEurope, Prague, May 29, 2006. 
1999 [article online]; available from http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/05/543497d3-0690-4937-
a6fb-06379f12f9ba.html  (accessed March 9, 2008).   
3 Defined here as ‘transnational organized crime related to human, drugs, or arms trafficking.’ 
4 NATO, “Membership Action Plan (MAP),” NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)66, April 24, 1999 
[article online]; available from http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/; Internet; accessed August 10, 2007. 
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Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU.5 As such, these milestones represent an 
important step for Albania on the path toward membership in the EU and NATO, and 
toward democracy in general.  But, at the same time, they represent an ongoing 
obligation for Albania to commit itself into continuing its efforts of strengthening its 
democratic society, where some of the major projects and challenges it faces are those 
related to matters of national security and its Intelligence Services, to include providing 
useful intelligence for fighting organized crime, corruption, terrorism, and the 
implementation of international obligations in these areas.  
Albanians and their political representatives are working to consolidate their 
democracy, reforming and restructuring social structures and creating new intelligence 
services with a revised role and mission to both protect and foster democratic society.  
New political realities have brought about a profound psychological transformation in 
intelligence thinking. This, in turn, has led directly to a complete revision of the 
professional perceptions of new allies, new enemies, new threats, and new priorities. 
However, the post-9/11 security environment and the process of integration in European 
and Euro-Atlantic institutions proved that further steps should be taken, and that the 
performance and the reform of the intelligence services should be focused on the 
challenges that Albania, as a new democratic society, should have at its forefront.6 
Despite the good results that the intelligence services have achieved in the war against 
terrorism, combating extremism, and fighting organized crime, it is apparent that this 
transformation process is not yet complete.7  
The issues facing the Albanian Intelligence Services are best summarized in the 
recommendations made by the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of European Council on June 2, 2005.  The Committee highly recommended 
                                                 
5 See Stabilizations and Association Agreement (SAA) between the European Community (EC) and 
Albania available from http://mie.gov.al/skedaret/1159172212-SAA%20Final%20EN.pdf; Internet; 
accessed August 13, 2007.     
6 For more see “NATO’s Intelligence Concerns,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, September 5, 2003 
[journal online]; available from http://jid.janes.com/; Internet; accessed June 13, 2007. 
7 See “The Balkans: Security and  Foreign Forces, Albania,” Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, June 
13, 2007 [journal online]; available from 
http://jmsa.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/JDIC/JMSA/search/quickSearchResults.do?searchTerm; Internet; 
accessed December 12, 2007. 
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continuing the process of reform in the intelligence and security services for new member 
states to fulfill these following standards:  (a) the functioning of these services must be 
based on clear and appropriate legislation; (b) each parliament should have an 
appropriately functioning committee. Supervision of the intelligence services’ “remits” 
and budgets is a minimum perquisite; (c) conditions for the use of exceptional measures 
by these services must be laid down in law with precise time limits; (d) under no 
circumstances should the intelligence services be politicized as they must be able to 
report to policy makers in an objective, impartial, and professional manner.  Further, any 
restrictions imposed on the civil and political rights of security personnel must be 
prescribed by the law; and, (e) parliament must be kept regularly informed about general 
intelligence policy.8  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The end of the Cold War and the new threats that are facing today’s democratic 
societies indicate that intelligence is a necessity for modern governments, and that 
intelligence services are essential in order for any state to protect its values and interests. 
They play a crucial role in providing necessary information and analysis relevant to the 
security of a nation and its society, as well as helping to safeguard the national interest. 
For this reason, intelligence and intelligence services have an indispensable role in 
democratic societies.9   
As crucial as they are for a nation, intelligence services are also considered a 
potential threat to both democracy and democratic society.  First, knowing that they 
provide substantial information to those in power means that those who hold this 
information are powerful;10 and second, to be effective, most intelligence activities are 
                                                 
8 See Parliamentary Assembly of European Council, “Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in 
Member States,” Recommendation 1713 of the Parliamentary Assembly of European Council [article 
online]; available from http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA05/EREC1713.htm; Internet; 
accessed December 11, 2007. 
9 Theodor H. Winkler and Leif Mevik, “Foreword,” in Who’s Watching the Spies? ed. Hans Born, 
Loch K. Johnson and Jan Leigh (Washington D.C.:  Potomac Books, 2005), ix.  
10 Robert Jervis, “Intelligence, Civil-Intelligence Relations, and Democracy” in Reforming 
Intelligence : Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. 
Boraz (Austin:  University of Texas Press, 2007), vii. 
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developed discreetly and in secret, potentially in opposition to the democratic principles of 
accountability and transparence.  This is less of a problem in established democracies then 
establishing democracies. Because of that, the new democracies are in the process of 
rebuking the worst experiences garnered from past regimes, and are creating new regimes, 
based on the best practices of more established democratic societies.11 Successful 
consolidation of the democratic process, particularly in new democratic countries, former 
Communist nations, or ex-totalitarian regimes necessitates civilian control over the military:  
this is one of four necessary processes of democratization of the state in new democracies.12  
Civil-military relations (CMR), as one school of thought, emphasizes the role of civil 
democratic control over the military and intelligence services.  This is defined as a subset of 
the civilian-military relations, and is one of the most problematic; particularly in new 
democracies when one considers the importance of the intelligence communities in these 
countries.13 The second school of thought is called Security Sector Reform (SSR).  It stems 
from the field of civil-military relations (CMR), particularly in relation to developments in 
Central and Eastern Europe where post-Communist circumstances have led many analysts to 
think more holistically about key aspects of CMR.14 
The Civil–Military Relationship,15and Security Sector Reforms,16 seem to have 
included in their studies the relationships between intelligence, the state, and civil society 
                                                 
11 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Reforming Intelligence: the Challenge of Control in New Democracy,” in 
Who Guardians the Guardians and How, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin:  
University of Texas Press, 2006), 145. 
12 Philippe C. Schmitter, “The Consolidation of Political Democracies:  Processes, Rhythms, 
Sequences and Types,” in Transitions to Democracy, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (Aldershot:  Dartmouth, 1995), 
562. 
13 Alfred Stepan, “Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone,” in The Brazilian 
Intelligence System in Comparative Perspective, ed. Alfred Stepan (NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1988), 
13-29. 
14 Timothy Edmunds, “Security sector reform: Concepts and implementation,” in Towards Security 
Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe: A Framework for Assessment, ed. Wilhelm N. Germann and 
Timothy Edmunds [book online] (DCAF/BICC, 2003); available from 
http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=20278&nav1=4; Internet; cited December 14, 
2007. 
15 Jervis, vii. 
16 Greg Hannah, Kevin A. O’Brien, and Andrew Rathmell “Intelligence and Security Legislation for 
Security Sector Reform,” RAND: Technical Report [article online] available from  
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR288.pdf; Internet; accessed December 14, 
2007. 
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as part of the democratic process of those societies:  to have the intelligence services 
under civilian control as well as to ensure their effectiveness and efficiency.  These are 
fundamental considerations for established democracies, and are even more essential for 
new democracies navigating the difficult path to consolidating their democracy.  
Both schools of thought are focused on the process of ensuring civilian control of 
the intelligence services, to ensure adequate oversight of the intelligence community with 
a view to maintaining roles and operations consistent with the mandate of the elected 
government. The necessity for exercising oversight and civilian control of the intelligence 
apparatus in the post dictatorial and totalitarian regimes comes from the requirement of a 
democratic society to ensure that the intelligence services do not influence or interfere in 
political competition.17 The two schools share the common theme that in order to have a 
consolidated democratic society, civilian authority must give the intelligence services a 
clear role and mission, and provide a budget and professional staff of intelligence 
operators in order to fulfill their assigned tasks.  This must be balanced with the fact that 
intelligence agencies will focus on the duties assigned to them by their political leaders in 
the interest of their nation.18 Gathering intelligence on new threats and in new 
environments serves to prevent acts of political violence from occurring, and assist 
political leaders in responding to acts of violence when they do occur, as well as 
positively influencing international security. 
CMR and SSR both maintain that one of the most important issues facing the 
intelligence services in countries transitioning to democracy are legacies from the former 
intelligence services.  These legacies are a significant obstacle for the new democratic 
society because the role that the pervious services played during the totalitarian or 
dictatorial period, as political police who routinely abused human rights and evoked fear 
throughout a population, could undermine the relationship between the intelligence 
                                                 
17 Marina Caparini, “Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States,” in 
Democratic Control of the Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, ed. Hans Born and Marina 
Caparini (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 3-4. 
18 Steven C. Boraz, “Executive Privilege:  Intelligence Oversight in the United State,” in Reforming 
Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven 
C.Boraz (Austin:  University of Texas Press, 2007), 29-34. 
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community and a fledgling democracy.19 Similarly, both schools see the professionalism 
of the intelligence services as fundamental for them to be able to fulfill the needs of the 
civilian state government in an effective and efficient manner while being consistent with 
the democratic system.20    
The SSR given that is a key element in any process of post-authoritarian or post-
conflict transition, has emerged in Central and Eastern Europe, but particularly in 
Western Balkans remains an important factor for these countries wanting to join the EU 
and NATO.21  In this context the EU and NATO also play a central role, and the prospect 
of future membership in these two organizations has become one of the main incentives 
for the reform in the security sector, the intelligence services in particular.22 
Moreover, the SSR is a process that in post-authoritarian societies comprises two 
phases.  In the first phase the SSR is more interested in establishing new institutions, 
structures, and legislation for democratic control and depoliticizing the intelligence 
services as part of the security sector.23 In the second phase the SSR is more concerned 
with the consolidation of achievements of the democratic procedures of oversight and 
transparency, more so than the way that intelligence institutions implement policy and 
improvements in effectiveness and efficiency.24 
                                                 
19 Andrzej Zybertowitz, “Transformation of the Polish Secret Service: from Authoritarian to Informal 
Power Networks” in Democratic Control of the Intelligence Services: Containing Rouge Elephants, ed. 
Hans Born and Marina Caparini (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 65-82. 
20 Greg Hannah, Kevin A. O’Brien, and Andrew Rathmell.  
21 Philipp Fluri, “Preface,” in Oversight and Guidance: The Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight for 
the Security Sector and  Its Reform, ed. Hans Born, Philipp H. Fluri, and Simon Lunn see  
http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/dcaf_doc4.pdf   (accessed December 20, 2007) 
22 Owen Greene, “International Standards and Obligations:  Norms and Criteria for DCAF in EU, 
OSCE, and OECD areas” in Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe: A Framework for 
Assessment, ed. Wilhelm N. Germann and Timothy Edmunds [book online] (DCAF / BICC, 2003).  
Available from http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=20278&nav1=4; Internet; 
cited December 14, 2007. 
23 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), “Report on  the  
Democratic Oversight of the Security Service,” Study No. 388/2006 (Strasbourg, 11 June 2007) [article 
online]; available from.http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL-AD(2007)016-e.asp;  Internet; accessed 
December 21, 2007. 
24 Edmunds.  
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The thesis will focus on analyzing the challenges facing the Albanian intelligence 
services during the first phase of the implementation of the SSR reform.  Specifically, it 
will address what progress has been made in addressing these challenges, and what 
problems still remain.  Further, it will consider which challenges these services should 
address during the second phase of the consolidation of the SSR reform in the process of 
integration in EU and NATO.  Finally, what are the lessons learned from similar cases 
that may be applied in Albania. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES  
This thesis utilizes the case study method to show some of the methods used to 
reform the intelligence and security services and to integrate countries into the EU and 
NATO, as well as to identify lessons learned and best practices.25 Some of the practices 
will tell as the problems and difficulties that other countries have passed, but also will 
teach us to use their best experiences and achievements and avoid their “mistakes” or 
“wrong ways”. The thesis employs a controlled comparison of the Romanian experience, 
a country with rather similar political, social, and cultural make-up.  Romania and 
Albania share common geographical and historical backgrounds and face similar new 
internal and external threats; thus, Romania is an appropriate model of a nation in which 
reform policies in the intelligence and security sector have resulted in significant 
improvements.  
This study will be conducted using secondary sources comprised, in large part, of 
studies made by specialized institutions such as the Geneva Center for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forced (DCAF), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
EU Enlargement Commission, US Department of State, and the United States Institute 
for Peace.  Additionally, reports from International Commission on the Balkans, 
International Crisis Group (ICG), and the Institute for Security Studies will be relied 
upon. 
                                                 
25 Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, “Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and 
Effectiveness,” in Reforming Intelligence, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, (Austin:  
University of Texas Press, 2006), 21. 
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E. THESIS ORGANIZATION  
The entire study is divided into five chapters, commencing with this introduction 
as Chapter I.  The second chapter offers a historical and political background of the 
intelligence services of Albania, and discusses the intelligence services’ role as a political 
and military organization in support of a dictatorial regime.  Chapter III examines the 
current process of the transformation of the intelligence services, their problems, legal 
frameworks, civil oversight and control, as well as the political initiative to fulfill NATO 
and European Union policies as part of the Civil-Military Relations and Security Sector 
Reforms in intelligence services.  This chapter also presents discussion on the negative 
impact associated with the legacy from former-Communist structures that have hindered 
the reform of the intelligence services and the detrimental effects of the reform with 
regard to the consolidation of new democratic institutions.  Chapter IV is dedicated to 
examining the experience of the Romanian intelligence services, including the processes 
they undertook to realize transformation of their intelligence services and attain 
democratic standards.  The last chapter will provide conclusions and recommendations to 
improve the reform in the Albanian intelligence services, which should assist with the 
integration of the country into Euro-Atlantic institutions and the European Union. 
F. DEFINITION 
In order to better understand several concepts used in this thesis, it is necessary to 
define them.  Specifically, what is intelligence?  What is the aim of the state in building 
intelligence services?  What are the functions of intelligence?  What does the control over 
the intelligence services mean, and who are the main actors exercising that control? 
Intelligence is a broad concept with three meanings: 
First, Intelligence is a process by which specific types of the information 
important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and 
disseminated to the policy maker, and as the way in which certain types of 
the covert are convinced and conduced. Second, Intelligence is a product; 
it can be thought of as the product of processes like the analyses and 
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intelligence operations themselves. Third, Intelligence is an organization; 
it can be thought of as the units that carry out its various the functions.26 
This study is focused on the third meaning of the intelligence, as an institution of 
the state. A state builds intelligence organizations for two main purposes:  first, to 
provide policy makers with required information and reliable analysis relating to internal 
and external state security, national defense, and foreign relations; and second, to support 
military operations or police forces with adequate information for the purpose of national 
security.27  To accomplish these tasks intelligence organizations conduct four activities: 
collection, analysis, counter-intelligence and covert operations.  
Collection is the process of producing information to fulfill the needs of policy 
makers as well as military or police forces.  To serve this purpose the intelligence 
organizations build their sources for collection as:  human intelligence( HUMINT), 
signals intelligence (SIGNIT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature 
intelligence (MASINT), open - source intelligence (OSINT).28 Analysis is not merely 
reorganizing data and information and creating a better organized product.  First, analysis 
should fully describe the phenomenon under study.  Second, at the next higher level of 
analysis, a thorough explanation of the phenomenon is obtained by interpreting the 
significance and effects of its constituent elements upon the whole.  Ideally, analysis can 
reach successfully beyond the descriptive and explanatory levels and up to synthesis and 
effective persuasion, often referred to as estimation.  The purpose of intelligence analysis 
is to reveal to decision makers or military commanders the underlying significance of 
selected target information.29   
Counterintelligence and security intelligence have the purpose of protecting the 
state and its secrets through the acquisition of information or knowledge of activities 
from hostile states and their intelligence services.  These activities involve techniques 
                                                 
26 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secret to Policy (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly 
Press, 2003), 9. 
27 Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C.Boraz, 6-7. 
28 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge & New York:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 61-81. 
29 Ibid., 100-112. 
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such as espionage against foreign intelligence services, debriefing of defectors, analysis 
of the methods of hostile operations, penetration and disruption of these hostile services 
and their activities.30 Likewise, activities are undertaken to protect a nation and its 
interests from espionage, sabotage, foreign influence activities, political violence and 
subversion.31 Interestingly, in opposition to the mission and role of the 
counterintelligence and security activities in a democratic society, in totalitarian or 
authoritarian regimes the role and mission of counterintelligence and security services is 
to protect the regime and to threaten opponents of the regime, and, more broadly, the 
citizens of the nation.32  
Covert action can be defined as any operation or activity designed to influence 
foreign governments in support of the sponsoring government’s foreign policy objectives 
while keeping the sponsoring government’s role in the operation a secret.  Covert 
operations include many types of activities across a range of violence and degree of 
plausible deniability.   The lowest level is propaganda against another country in support 
of individuals or groups friendly to one side while undermining one’s opposition.  
Second, it is a political activity against the target country with an objective to intervene in 
its political process by funding or providing other support to government leaders, 
political parties, unions, or the opposition.  Political activity is an escalation above the 
use of propaganda, but both can be employed simultaneously.  Third are economic 
activities against hostile governments.  The fourth level is the overthrowing of 
governments by coup d’état.  The highest level is the conduct of paramilitary operations 
which is the most violent type of covert operation and includes military operations and 
direct assault against an enemy.33  
‘Control’ of the intelligence services in democratic society means direction and 
supervision.  With direction it is important to note that the responsibility for the 
                                                 
30 Abraham N. Shulsky, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence (Washington, D.C: 
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1993), 111. 
31 Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State (New York:  
Fran Cass, 1994), 6-7. 
32 Caparini, 6-7. 
33 Lowenthal, 157-173. 
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intelligence services rests with civilians.  Likewise, it is the responsibility of democratic 
governments to supervise all the aspects of the intelligence services from their 
organization, budget, and personnel, to their legislative structure.  The institutions that 
have been created to control the intelligence system in democratic societies are nested 
within legislative bodies, executive branches and internal controls, judicial systems, and 
public scrutiny.34  
 
                                                 
34 Boraz, 27. 
 13
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ALBANIAN 
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 
A. ALBANIA’S NASCENT SECURITY SERVICES  
Situated on the European Continent surrounded by powerful, warring empires, 
Albania has witnessed considerable conflict and tumult throughout its history at the hands 
of the Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, and Ottomans.  From 8-6 BC Albania was colonized 
by the Greeks, and after that the Romans occupied the Illyrian in 165 BC.  During this 
period Illyria was reorganized as a Roman territory and divided into the provinces of 
Dalmatia, which is modern-day Croatia, and Pannonia, the area that incorporates Albania 
today. After the fall of the Roman Empire, Albania was integrated into the Byzantine 
Empire which ruled over Albania until the fourteenth-century AD when the Ottoman 
Turks took control of the entire Byzantine Empire.  Albanians, during the mid-fifteenth-
century became a symbol of the resistance against the Ottomans and their proselytizing of 
Islam upon Europe.  The Albanian leader Skanderbeg (George Kastriot) halted Ottoman 
efforts to spread Islam to Albania and Western Europe for more than two decades until he 
died in 1468.  In recognition of his persistent resistance, Pope Pius II conferred upon him 
the title “Athleta Christi” - “Champion of Christ.” After Skanderbeg’s death the Ottoman 
occupation of Albania lasted for more than five hundred years until November 28, 1912, 
when Albania gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire. 
By the end of the Second Balkan War in 1913, with Ottoman influence removed 
from the Balkans, Albania faced a new threat:  the possibility of being absorbed by the 
aggressive foreign policies of one of its neighboring countries, namely Serbia, Greece 
and Italy.  It was under these circumstances and in the interest of national survival that 
the newly created Albanian provisional government decided to form both the national 
army and intelligence service.35 The decisions and official records of the interim 
                                                 
35 In the period immediately following the proclamation of the independence of Albania (November 
28, 1912) while the Second Balkan War continued, parts of Albanian territory were occupied:  by Serbs in 
the North, Greeks in South East, and the Italians maintained an interest in the city of Vlora. 
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government of Vlora”36 relating to ‘political, military, and financial issues,’ dated 4 of 
Shendre 1328 (referring to the old Turkish calendar, corresponding to December 17, 1912 
on the Gregorian calendar) states that:  “the organization of a secret service for the 
occupied territories of Albania be done.”37 
The first Albanian government assigned the newly established secret service a 
primary duty of collecting intelligence with a specific focus on the occupied areas.38  The 
intent of gathering information in the occupied areas was aimed at both liberating and 
establishing state authority throughout the territory of the new Albanian state; moreover, 
this appears to have been the fundamental mission of the secret service.  We can hereby 
mention the requests for gathering intelligence on the activity of neighbor countries 
enemy troops that were striking terror and unrest through murder and robberies in the 
liberated areas. 
By 1925 Albania became a consolidated state under the rule of Ahmed Zogu who, 
in 1928, declared himself King Zog I -- the first Albanian monarch.  During his reign the 
parliament and his government reorganized the secret service; concomitantly, this service 
began to be more institutionally shaped and was placed under the Secret Office, 
administered by the Ministry of Interior Affairs. This lasted till 1939, when the Second 
World War started and Albania was occupied by the Nazi-fascist forces.39 
                                                 
36 Vlora is the city in South Albania where, on November 28, 1912 the leaders from the different 
regions of Albania declared the independence.  
37 The post-Communist Albanian state recognizes December 17, 1912 as the official date of the 
establishment of the secret services as determined by a Decision of the Council of Ministers of the 
Albanian Government, No. 486 (National Archives, July 14, 2006).  Fund No.145 (Head of the Temporary 
Government of Vlora, 1912, Vol. II), 5. 
38 Ibid., 6. 
39 Stefanaq Pollo and Arben Puto, The History of Albania from Its Origins to the Present Day 
(London and Boston:  Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 197-222. 
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B. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES DURING THE COMMUNIST REGIME  
1. Organs of State Security (OSS), a Political Police Force 
The Albanian Communist Party, which was the political leadership of the 
National Liberation Army (NLA )40 during the Second World War, actively sought to 
destroy the infrastructure of the old political system and to create new Communist 
institutions.  One of these institutions, and the perhaps the most faithful, was the secret 
service.  Initially the Communists named it the Secret Informative Service, but later took 
the name of the Organs of the State Security (OSS).  The decision to create a secret 
service was made during the first conference of the Albanian Communist Party on March 
20, 1943 when the senior leaders of the Communist Party announced the creation of the 
Albanian Secret Informative Service, its structural organization, and priorities and tasks 
of its activities.41 
Since its establishment, it had become quite evident that the Secret Service would 
be completely politically driven.  Aside from obvious assignments like the collection of 
intelligence related to the activities of the contemporary Nazi occupiers, the service was 
targeting and controlling the activities of the Communist Party’s political opposition, the 
so-called ‘Fifth Column’ aligned with the Nazis.  The secret service had also focused on 
collecting intelligence relating to the activities of foreign missions, most commonly the 
Anglo-Americans,42 as they were considered to be obstacles to the post-conflict 
aspirations of the Albanian Communist Party:  by contrast, the Soviets and Yugoslavians 
were considered partners and friends by the Communist leadership. All the intelligence 
collected was sent directly to the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party 
which then will assign to the secret services the duty to keep “the internal and external 
enemies” under surveillance and close watch or even their physical elimination. 
 
                                                 
40 Apart from the Communist Party, “Legality” and the “National Front” were already established  as 
political parties in Albania during World War II, and each had their own military organizations. 
41 Enver Hoxha, Always Vigilant: for the Organs of the Interior Affairs, Vol. I (Tirana:  Publishing 
House 8 Nentori, 1986), 44-48 and 250-256. 
42 Ibid., 49-50 and 142-143. 
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a. The Role, Mission and Structure  
In November 1944 Albania was liberated from the Nazi-fascist regime, 
only to find itself under a totalitarian communist regime that would last for more than 46 
years. Enver Hoxha,43 a xenophobic Communist leader, turned the country into the most 
isolated place in Europe.44 The first mission of the Communist leadership was to 
consolidate their power and influence, prior to instigating a strategy to attain their far-
reaching political ambition.45  The Communist leadership focused on organizing and 
shaping the new structure of the secret service as the main weapon for liquidation of their 
political opposition.46 
In 1945, right after the Communist Party took power, the secret service 
was organized under the People’s Defense Division which was staffed by Hoxha’s most 
trusted brother-in-arms. It targeted the Communist Party’s political opponents, the so-
called ‘reactionary elements,’ those wealthy individuals labeled “bourgeois strata” by the 
Communists. The division was organized into some regiments of infantry that would be 
ordered to quell domestic disturbances if posing a threat to the party leadership. The 
People’s Defense Division consisted of the secret service, the State Police, and the 
Border Guard, all incorporated into the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA).47  
Like other intelligence services of the Eastern Bloc, the Albanian security 
service had been part of the Communist’s intelligence ‘family.’ The history of the 
relationship amongst the Albanian OSS better known as “Sigurimi” and its foreign 
counterparts has waxed and waned commensurate with the political relationship of the 
Albanian Communist regime and its Communist neighbors.  As with all Eastern Bloc 
nations, the Albanian Sigurimi was under the influence of the Soviet intelligence services.  
                                                 
43 Enver Hoxha was the leader of the Albanian Communist Party and the dictator of the Albanian 
Communist regime. 
44 See Welcome to Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1 Internet; 
accessed March 4, 2008.  
45 The general elections held on December 2, 1944 instituted the Communist regime in Albania, with 
Enver Hoxha as its leader.  
46 Hoxha, 442-446. 
47 Pollo and Puto, 246. 
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The Soviets worked closely with OSS leadership from the late 1940’s through the early 
1960’s, significantly influencing both the nature and structure of OSS.48 The Soviet 
Security methodology was applied at large in the Albanian Sigurimi even after Albania 
officially severed relations with the Soviet Union.  
The Soviet secret services had developed its background from the 
Ochrana.49 In the late eighteenth-century Russia founded the Ochrana, a secret police 
force extant within the Ministry of Internal Affairs to monitor its internal opponents.  
After the Russian Revolution the Ochrana was succeeded by the Cheka,50 the Bolshevik 
security service, which adopted similar methods as previous services.  From its inception 
the raison d’être of the Cheka was to target remnants of the Tsarist regime and opposing 
communist parties such as the Social Revolutionaries and other anti-Bolshevik groups.  
Alternately, the Bolshevik state, like other dictatorial regimes, also had opponents abroad.  
Thus, from Cheka, the first secret political service of the after the Russian Revolution to 
KGB 51 the last security agency of the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR),52 they 
developed external departments to deal with the neutralization of those political 
opponents abroad who the regime considered threats.  These departments would 
ultimately become full-fledged foreign intelligence operations.  The same system was 
adopted by the Communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe.53 
Within the Ministry of Interior, Sigurimi was a centralized service with 
three main directories (the first directory was the Counterintelligence Service, the second 
directory was the Physical Security Service, and the last was the Foreign Service).They 
were all headed by the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. MIA was part of the 
                                                 
48 Nicholas Bethell, Betrayed (New York:  Times Books, 1984), 7. 
49The Okhrannoye Otdeleniye (translated from Russian it literally means “Protection Section”) is 
usually referred to as the Okhrana in Western sources. 
50 In Russian:  Vserossijskaya Chrezvychajnaya Komissiya.  In English it translates to “The All-
Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage.”  
51 KGB is the Russian abbreviation for Committee for State Security (Russian: Комитет 
государственной безопасности,) which was the official name the umbrella organization serving as the 
Soviet Union's premier security agency, secret police, and intelligence agency, from 1954 to 1991. 
52 The Soviet Union had a succession of secret police agencies over the course of its existence.  
53 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 19-20.  
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executive government and had established its presence countrywide, incorporated within 
the District Stations of Internal Affairs; and, by law it was part of the Armed Forces of 
the People’s Republic of Albania.  
The first counter-intelligence directorate was organized with both a 
national headquarters with different branches, and district headquarters in each of 
Albania’s twenty-six districts.  The counter-espionage branch was responsible for 
neutralizing foreign intelligence operations in Albania, as well as domestic movements 
and political opposition.  The second branch was responsible for monitoring and 
controlling the activity of foreigners posted to Albania by the foreign diplomatic missions 
and locals who were in contact with them.  The third branch was in charge of monitoring 
Albanian police, border guards, and prison camps.  The Prisons Section was charged with 
the political re-education of inmates and the evaluation of the degree to which they posed 
a danger to society.  The fourth branch comprised the Sigurimi Filing Section and 
Archives. Sigurimi records, files, and statistics were stored and administered by this 
branch.  The fifth dealt with telecommunications censorship.  It was involved in an 
extensive program of monitoring and intercepting private phone conversations and mail. 
The sixth was Army Counter-intelligence.  The seventh branch was in charge of the 
collection and evaluation of intelligence dealing with crimes against the socialist 
economy.  The eighth branch was the Political Control Section.  Its primary function was 
the monitoring of the political loyalty of the party members.  The eighth branch bears 
responsibility for the purge of many individuals:  members of the party, government, and 
military, under alleged charges of diversion, sabotage, and discrete collaboration with 
countries labeled hostile to Albania:  countries such as Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and 
China, from all of which Albania severed alliances.54 More than 170 communist party 
Politburo and Party Central Committee members were executed as a result of the 
Sigurimi’s set-up cases.55  
                                                 
54 Raymond E. Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, Albania: A Country Study (Washington, DC:  Federal 
Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994). 
55 Arshi Pipa, Albanian Stalinism: Ideo-Political Aspects (Columbia University Press, New York, 
1990), 79-80. 
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The second directorate was in charge of providing protection and security 
to the Politburo in general and to the dictator and his family. The third directorate, the 
foreign intelligence directorate, was focused on collecting intelligence from external 
threats targeting the communist regime which, in most cases, were masterminded by the 
dissident Albanian Diaspora in foreign countries.  Because of this, the Foreign 
Intelligence Directorate maintained personnel in Albanian embassies under a diplomatic 
cover and was focused on the activity of elements that lived outside Albania, with a view 
to maintaining observation and control in order to disrupt plans of attempt to overthrow 
the extant communist regime in Albania. 
Sigurimi as a whole was basically a collection mechanism more so than an 
analytical mechanism.  There was no structured analytical unit in charge of intelligence 
processing and analysis.  In most cases the information sent to customers was both 
subjective and biased.  The main consumer of the information was known to be the Party 
Central Committee Apparatus, which used intelligence to both strengthen its political 
power, and as a punitive mechanism against any non-desirable or opposition element. 
b. Political Duties and Control  
The Albanian Communist regime further accentuated the existence of the 
OSS as a political weapon of the party.  From its first years, the Albanian Communist 
Party clearly demarcated that it was the party itself that would dictate the type of 
information that should be gathered, who should be observed, and the policies relating to 
dealing with political opponents.56 Enver Hoxha, head of the Communist Party, was 
vested with the authority of head of the state as well; resulting in near-absolute authority 
over all state institutions, including the OSS.  The Communist Party mentored the activity 
of the OSS by politically and ideologically indoctrinating it.  The Minister of Internal 
Affairs, who was the head of the OSS, was also a member of the Political Bureau.   
The priorities, objectives, goals, and scope of activity for the Sigurimi 
were determined by the Communist leadership. Although some of the activities of OSS 
                                                 
56 Hoxha, 460-462. 
 20
were in the interest of the country, the fundamental goal of the organization rested in the 
protection and preservation of the dictatorship. As such the basic reference for the 
activity of Sigurimi served the OSS Platform,57 a fundamental, doctrinaire, procedural 
manual approved by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Albanian 
Communist Party.  The OSS Platform stipulated that (OSS) targeted all persons who 
committed ‘crimes’ against the Communist state, a list of which was comprehensively 
described in the existing Penal Code.  The fundamental principle of the functioning of the 
OSS was that of “class struggle,” a principle that stimulated controversy between two 
groups, one representing the dictatorship and the other one representing the opponents of 
the communist regime and its ideology, respectively.58   
It is evident that the OSS had a predetermined target, based on the 
aforementioned ideological and political criteria, the so-called “declassed” and “anti-
socialist” elements were targeted and grouped into “contingents.”  They were segregated 
from the rest of the population and were subject to constant monitoring and scrutiny of 
OSS personnel.  The OSS was so zealous in the execution of their assigned duties that 
they would falsely prosecute political opponents for activities and deeds that they had 
never committed.  Intimidation and blackmail were some of the methods the OSS used to 
force their targets to provide false evidence, even against themselves.  Operationally, 
OSS succeeded in creating a massive network of informants within the “contingents” 
that, in many cases, ended up targeting and collecting data on each other. 59 
Based on the fact that the OSS was leaded, guided and served to the 
Communist Party, its employees were simply considered by the Communist Party as 
political workers.  This was the basis for the so-called “political police,” where political 
affiliation fully prevailed over professional competencies.60 
                                                 
57See Aleksander Meksi, “Sigurimi I Shtetit dhe Arkivat e Tij,” [article online]; available from  
http://www.aleksandermeksi.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2006/10/sigurimi-i-shtetit-dhe-arkivat-e-tij.pdf; 
Internet; accessed January 29, 2008. 
58Ibid. 
59Ibid. 
60 Hoxha, 69-72. 
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There was no parliamentary control of the Sigurimi, but there was control 
from the Communist Party.  The activities of the service were directly monitored by a 
group of people in the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, which was 
the highest power-bearing organization of Dictator Enver Hoxha. The Central Committee 
determined whether OSS had respected the doctrine of the party, dictated the duties it 
was tasked with, and approved the progression or regression of the careers of the 
Communist Party’s highest executives from the Minister to the vice-chairmen of the 
regional branches.61  
c. Professionalism 
Sigurimi had its own school for training, it was a military school 
subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  It provided training for the employees of 
the three main services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs:  political, military and 
professional. Consequently, the structure of the school was divided into three branches, 
mirroring the three main functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, namely the 
Security Branch, the Police Force and the Border Guard Branch. 
As in all communist education systems, communist ideology was an 
essential part of the curriculum.  In this specific school, the ideology and the subjects of a 
political nature covered approximately 30 percent of the subject matter, whereas military 
and professional training were somewhat secondary.  Besides the subjects with an 
ideological focus, the professional and military training topics were also quite politicized; 
wherein the role of the Communist Party and the dictator were frequently overstated. 
The basic foundation for selecting a candidate to attend the school was 
politically motivated in that not only the candidate, but his entire family, had to go 
through a strict political vetting process before getting clearance.  Second, throughout the 
school the student remained on probation, meaning that political loyalty was still a  
 
 
                                                 
61 Elez Biberaj, Albania: A Socialist Maverick (Boulder:  Westview Press, 1990), 53-54. 
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potential criterion.  Loyalty to the regime, the Communist Party and its leader was 
paramount for the people that served in OSS and remained the main potential criteria in 
their whole career.  
Although it faithfully served the Communist Party, the role of the OSS 
was underestimated and overshadowed by the Communist leader Hoxha when he stated:  
“The Organs of the State Security cannot boastfully claim that it succeeded in uncovering 
the activity of the hostile groups, because at the end, the potential hostile groups were 
uncovered by the Party, instead.”62 This comment was apparently driven by the paranoia 
and distress of the dictator himself, which caused him to perceive a decline of the Party’s 
control over the Sigurimi.  Hoxha accused all ex-security service directors of distorting 
the policy of the Communist Party in the OSS and accused them of being “agents” of the 
foreign intelligence services; subsequently he purged them.  Hoxha’s actions served two 
purposes:  First, to perpetuate his rule by evoking fear amongst his security officers, and 
second, to purge all those who were directly responsible for ‘crimes’ against the 
Communist Party.  
After these political eliminations, the Party started to recruit and employ 
new security officers in the Sigurimi structure who were Party members, or, as Hoxha 
called them, “new communist blood.” These ‘reliable’ people depended upon, and were 
connected to the closest clan of the dictator:  often, after a short period of training they 
were employed in the most strategic positions of the service -- Intelligence or Counter-
Intelligence.  But these measures bore negative consequences, in many cases destroying 
the little professionalism that remained in the service. 
2. Military Intelligence Directorate 
The Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) was a military and political structure 
in the Albanian Armed Forces. The Military Intelligence Directorate, like Sigurimi, was 
almost directly subordinated to the senior leadership of the Communist Party.  By virtue 
of the Albanian Constitution, the Armed Forces were under direct command of the 
                                                 
62 Hoxha, 613-614. 
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Communist Party; specifically, they responded to the leader of the communist party who 
was also the Army Commander-in-Chief.  The Minister of People’s Defense was 
normally a member of the Council of Ministers and traditionally assigned as a Deputy 
Prime Minister and member of the Party Political Bureau.  The Minister exercised day-to-
day administrative control and, through the Chief-of–the-General Staff, operational 
control over all elements of the military.  
The key MID targets were perceived to be nations of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, as well as neighboring countries recently 
withdrawn from the military blocs, such as Yugoslavia.  The MID’s basis of operations 
was set forth by the Minister of People’s Defense and its activities were placed under the 
purview of the Defense Council Decisions.  The Military Intelligence Directorate’s 
intelligence collection efforts included both human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals 
intelligence (SIGINT).63HUMINT sources were conceived to be an extended structure of 
the military’s operational and tactical units, military commands, and several information 
centers, all related to the MID mission. The SIGINT sources to obtain data were radio 
intercepts (radio relay, teletype, telephoto) with enemies’ Armed Forces, and were 
considered to be first hand information.  Both HUMINT and SIGINT were channeled to 
the Intelligence Directorate, where from it was disseminated to the Commanders of the 
Armed Forces and field Military Centers.  
C. CONCLUSION 
During the Communist period, the intelligence services were one of the most 
important and successful political instruments of the Communist Party, which was used 
to control the Albanian society.  It had served as the mainstay of the Hoxha’s regime and 
provided an effective tool for maintaining power over the entire population.  Thousands 
of “class enemies” were executed, imprisoned, or interned in labor camps.  Sigurimi 
played a large role in the efforts that the Communists made to stay in power by violating 
basic human rights and earning the title of “political police.” 
                                                 
63Hoxha, 431-435. 
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The collapse of the Communist regime and the process of transformation of the 
intelligence services are associated with the legacy of the secret police.  Throughout the 
post communist transition period constantly the opposing parties have accused the parties 
in power of using the intelligence service as a political instrument in order to control and 
evoke fear.  While some of the legacy problems still exist, intelligence services reform 
has resulted in substantial change, but there is still a requirement for further 




III. ALBANIA CASE STUDY:  BUILDING NEW  
INTELLIGENCE INSTITUTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The immediate post-Communist period of the Albanian intelligence services 
represented the legacy of the old Communist service both in mentality and in structures:  
this was characterized by weak, unclear, and unconsolidated roles, missions and duties 
that reflected the relatively long lasting transition period of the Albanian state, as well as 
the weakness of the existing institutions and fragility of the established democracy.  
The reorganization of the new intelligence institutions went through two major 
developmental periods.  The first period, covering 1991-1992, was characterized by the 
efforts for change and amendment to the intelligence community under the legacy of 
Communist institutions.  The second period split into two sub terms; the first term 
starting in 1992 with the democratic elections that brought the opposition democratic 
forces into power, until 1997 when Albania was threatened by economic and political 
crises and the potential collapse of state institutions.  The second sub term started in 1998 
with the re-structuring of the intelligence community and continues to this day as Albania 
strives to meet the requisite criteria to join the EU and NATO. 
B. DISMANTLING THE OLD STRUCTURE AND ESTABLISHING THE 
NEW INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
The first phase of the reformation of the intelligence community started with the 
overthrow of the Communist regime in 1991.  The period of 1991-1992, was a period of 
great conciliation in all aspects of life after a half-century of dictatorship.  Combining a 
hatred for their oppressors and the desire for rapid democratic transformation, Albanians 
were eager to make up for a lack of an inherited democratic experience.  
The newly elected inaugural post-Communist pluralist parliament set forth with 
its primary task to do the democratization of the state institutions, including the 
intelligence community which still had the legacy of the former OSS Sigurimi.  
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Intelligence reform would be accomplished by creating new intelligence services that 
would not be affiliated with any political party.64 By placing the government in control of 
the intelligence community the government could be directly informed of both domestic 
and international threats.  The first measure taken was the suspension of the activities of 
the old intelligence service.  Secondly, the intelligence services were separated from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and divided into five smaller intelligence services. 
The main service to succeed the former Sigurimi was named the Albanian 
National Intelligence Service65 (NIS).  The NIS’ scope of activity included both foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence based on Act Number 7495, dated July 02, 1991 
titled “For the Organization of the National Intelligence Service.”66 The law clearly 
defined that the NIS was directly subordinated to the government and its main target of 
activity was to be threats and risks to national security other than political opposition. 
Further, political party membership of NIS personnel was prohibited by law.67 
The second service to be created was the Military Intelligence Service (MIS,)68 
which was established in accordance with Law Number 7530, passed on December 11, 
1991 titled “For the Organization of the Military Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence 
Service.”69 The mission of the MIS was to detect anti-constitutional activities within the 
Armed Forces, specifically to:  “collect intelligence to protect the country from foreign 
aggression and any other hostile activity conducted in the forms of espionage, sabotage, 
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diversion, political corruption, military provoking incidents to ensure the integrity and 
independence of the country.”70 As in the NIS, political party membership of MIS 
personnel was prohibited by law as well.  The MIS organizational structure consisted of 
Military Intelligence, Military Counter Intelligence, and a SIGINT battalion.  MIS main 
efforts and goals were approved by the Defence Council, but the organisation and its 
competences were defined by the Minister of Defence.  The Minister of Defence was, by 
law, the civilian authority in charge of overseeing MIS activity.  
The third service was the Counter-Intelligence Service of the Organs of the Public 
Order,71 established according to Law Number 7530, passed on December 11, 1991 “For 
the Organization of the Police Intelligence Service and the Counter-Intelligence Service 
in Organs of the Public Order.”72 The fourth service was the former-Physical Security 
Service, which was placed under the umbrella of the Republican Guard in charge of 
providing protection and security to senior state authorities.73 The fifth service was the 
Prison Intelligence Service, 74 it had a mission of gathering information on delinquency 
in prison system and was subordinated to the Ministry of Justice.  Note, however, that 
this service is no longer active.  
The government and parliament placed emphasis on the democratic oversight of 
the activities of the intelligence services,75 a new characteristic of the reform that was 
vested in parliament. A Parliamentary Committee chaired by the opposition party 
investigated the process of the suspension of the activity of the old security service and 
its division and transformation in several other services as well as the dismissal from the 
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new services of the ex-representatives of the Communist Party. This problem was 
supported in the most part from the new generation of employees in the service, as it was 
a problem that had previously created a contradiction with the other employees who were 
not members of any political party, introducing the idea of an intelligence service based 
on a professional career. 
Despite all the efforts of the personnel attached to the newly revised intelligence 
services to change the reputation of the services, less was achieved than desired in 
attempting to depose the old modus operandi and mentality.  The NIS, the main heir of 
Sigurimi legacy was not able to completely change its poor reputation and earn the 
credibility it needed.76 The reform process did manage, to a limited extent, to dismantle 
the structure of the previous service. 
C. THE FAILURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM, 1992-1997 
The beginning of the second phase of reformation is marked by the ascension to 
power of the right wing coalition parties following the general elections held on March 
22, 1992.  The intelligence community went through further reformation resulting in a 
number of positive steps, although the concept and the strategy of the reform was not 
well perceived initially, especially in relation to the National Intelligence Service. 
A large scale dismissal of ex-Sigurimi members from the NIS, whose membership 
in the service dropped to 2 percent by the mid-1990s, was considered a positive step.  
Parliament approved Act Number 8001, dated September 22, 1995 titled “On the 
Genocide and Crime Against Humanity Committed in Albania During Communist Rule 
on Political, Ideological and Religious Motives,”77 and Act Number 8043, dated 
November 30, 1995 - “On the Verification of the Moral Character of the Officials and 
Other Individuals Connected with the Protection of the Democratic State;” these 
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provisions prevented those who had previously worked for the Sigurimi from holding 
positions in government until the year 2002.78 The Albanian intelligence services 
established relations with foreign liaison services and became more concerned with, and 
willing to exchange, intelligence relating to regional security. 
The changes made in the intelligence community, particularly those in the NIS, 
did not bring about the anticipated level of progress. The reform was widely 
misperceived and its effectiveness was reduced, especially with reference to NIS, to a 
simple replacement of dismissed personnel with new inexperienced employees who, in 
most cases, had political affiliations. The new director of the service was picked from the 
membership of the new leading political party.79 Similarly the recruitment of mostly 
members of the political party, who were often incompetent, and the failure to proceed 
with fundamental reformation required during the 1996-1997 timeframe, had further 
negative consequences for the NIS. Political manipulation of the NIS and its use in a 
political context as a mean against the opposition parties was clearly a step backward. 
During the 1996 hotly disputed general elections (both nationally and internationally), the 
NIS was actively involved in the election process by shadowing and monitoring the 
activity of members of the opposition.80 Furthermore, during 1997’s civil unrest 
throughout the country, the NIS inspectors were sent to suppress the revolts that followed 
the crises of the pyramid schemes, next to the police forces.81 This resulted in the 
perpetuation of the same poor image of the Communist-era intelligence services; that of a 
partisan military service, essentially a ‘political police force.’ 
The poor oversight of the activities of the services led to illegal actions going on 
unchecked. None of the intelligence services were ever seriously scrutinized by the 
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Parliamentary Committee for Public Order.  The NIS acted mostly upon political 
orientations, rather than the government’s need for information serving national security. 
There was no exact institution or board established to determine the threats and dangers 
posed to the country or to define information requirements.82 From a professional 
respective, the service did not succeed in creating an open procedure for the employees it 
recruited, there was no school where the new recruits could be trained, and there was also 
a total lack of a career progression process. 
Apart from political affiliation and the lack of professionalism that pushed the 
NIS to illegally participate in violent actions in 1997, the contemporary existing law on 
the NIS, a law which was appropriate only for the time and purpose for which it was 
created, positively contributed to the regress of reforms.  The goal of the 1991 law was 
the dismantling of the OSS Sigurimi as a barrier to the process of democratization.  
Additionally, the law provided legal a basis for the creation of the new services and the 
placement of these new services under the civilian control of the government and 
parliament.     
Incorporation of the NIS, by law, as part of the Armed Forces represented a 
remnant from the Communist legacy.  In 1997, this designation provided a legal basis for 
the promotion of the head of an intelligence service with the military rank of General. 
The placement of director of NIS as the Head of Special Operations Forces,83 and the 
transformation of the intelligence services into militarized forces created a paradox that 
resulted in conflict with Police and the Armed Forces.  This paradox represented a legacy 
                                                 
82 British Helsinki Human Rights Group, “Intelligence Services See a Return of the Old Guard, 
[article online]; in Albania 1997:  Politics and Purge; available from 
http://www.bhhrg.org.albania/albania/1997/shik.htm; Internet; accessed January 24, 2008. 
83 The Albanian parliament, with Act No. 298, dated March 2, 1997 appointed the head of the NIS as 
the commander-in-chief of the operations against the revolt that followed the collapse of the pyramid-
schemes in 1997.  The schemes not only left masses of Albanians destitute, but also undermined the 
country's security and political stability as public revolt spread throughout the country.  For further 
information see http://www.qpz.gov.al/doc.jsp?doc=docs/Vendim%20Nr%20298%20Datë%2002-03-
1997.htm; Internet; accessed February 6, 2008. 
 31
of the past regime when the intelligence services, as the most trusted institutions of the 
leading party, controlled the state police and the armed forces.84 
This timeframe resulted in limited positive progress regarding the reformation of 
the intelligence community as it is marked by a number of setbacks and deviation of the 
intelligence services from their constitutional tasks, as well as accusations from civil 
society for not fully complying with the legal framework.  Despite the efforts of the new 
political leadership to reform the intelligence community and bring it under professional 
and democratic standards, it was not a resounding success because the reform was too 
spontaneous and it was led by the legacy of the old service.85 The political crisis of 1997 
led to a temporary moratorium of NIS activities, enacted by the national conciliation 
government.86 Furthermore, two heads of NIS, the director and the deputy director were 
named each from different political groups to lead and control the service.87 
D. THE NEED TO REORGANIZE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 
As previously discussed, the 1997 political crisis in Albania resulted, in part, due 
to the failure to reform and restructure the intelligence community; this served as an 
indication of regression for the transition of the state infrastructure as a whole.  
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The situation in the region was becoming even more threatening given the 
developments in Kosovo88 and the emerging risk of global terrorism.89 Given the 
contemporary security environment and the necessity of filling the gap of national 
intelligence collection, it became even more indispensable for the government to 
seriously consider ways to restructure the intelligence services and establish democratic 
levers to check that the intelligence activities are conducted in accordance with the legal 
framework.     
In 1997, the internal security situation became seriously aggravated and, at times, 
appeared hopeless given the fact that huge amounts of military weapons and ammunition 
looted from military depots fell into the hands of civilians, state institutions collapsed, 
and the rule of law did not exist in the most of the country.90 Such a situation was clearly 
to the advantage of organized crime groups that began to flourish, concentrating in illegal 
immigration, drugs and weapon smuggling, etc.91 
The problem of religious extremism became even more evident given the lack of 
measures taken by Albanian state agencies, particularly the intelligence community, to 
protect the country from the influence of religious radicals. During the mid-1990s 
Albania was a safe haven to a number of a declared members of the Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad (EIJ) organization and who posed a threat not only to the security of Albania, but to 
neighboring countries and beyond.  Many foreign radicals migrated from Middle Eastern 
countries under the cover of charity organizations, which made it difficult to detect, tack, 
and monitor, thus requiring intelligence experts to identify them.  Moreover, having been 
an atheistic country for almost a half-century and having been thoroughly isolated 
throughout the period of the dictatorship, Albania openly welcomed foreigners without 
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paying much attention to their background.92 Similarly, there was no legal premise to 
direct the intelligence and security services to observe antiterrorist activities.  This is 
further compounded by the fact that the intelligence services and political class at that 
time lacked understanding of the phenomenon today known as Islamist terrorism.93  
In addition to the aforementioned threats, the need to deepen democratic reforms, 
especially in the intelligence services, depended heavily upon the continuous interest of 
Albania to join NATO and the EU.  Complimentarily, NATO and the EU requested 
Albania’s parliament and government to continue the process of democratization, the war 
against terrorism, and to support the NATO and EU positions within the region.94 These 
requests by strategic partners, namely the US, the EU, and NATO, motivated the political 
class which, in turn, brought positive change in terms of the role and activity of the 
intelligence services.  
1. Reconstruction of the Intelligence Services 
a. State Intelligence Service  
The democratic transformation period of Albania re-commenced in earnest 
when the new government, elected in June 1997, considered further reform of the 
intelligence community -- especially that of the NIS -- as indispensable.  As a result of 
the destructive events prior to this time, and with the cessation of the activities of the 
NIS, the Albanian Parliament took the reign again in assuming a leading role in 
reforming the intelligence services and increasing its oversight role of the services.  In 
1998 parliament created an investigative committee charged with reviewing “the role of  
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the NIS on events of January-March 1997.”95 The investigation of this parliamentary 
committee would, in time, prove valuable as it identified facts implicating the NIS in the 
conduct of illegal activities.  
The new NIS leadership set up a working group to determine a new legal 
framework for the service as was requested by the newly elected Albanian Parliament.  
Eventually, the Albanian parliament approved Act Number 8391, signed October 28, 
1998 concerning the NIS (which would later change its name to the State Intelligence 
Service96 (SIS)).  This was a key piece of legislation wherein the mission of the NIS was 
clearly defined as an intelligence, counterintelligence, and analysis entity with a mission: 
a) to collect foreign intelligence that serves the national interest; b) conduct 
counterintelligence activity for the protection of the integrity, the independence and the 
constitutional order; c) to collect intelligence on terrorism, drug manufacturing and 
trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and crimes affecting 
environment; d) to collect intelligence on organized crime affecting the national security; 
e) to preserve the security of its activity, information, employees and property enabling 
suitable means, to include the vetting procedures and qualification of the candidates, 
employees and contractors; f) conduct back up technical administrative activity pursue 
the needs for the fulfillment of the functions mentioned here above. The de-politicization 
of NIS members was explicitly incorporated in the new Act, as well as the scope of its 
activity, vetting of the personnel, and recruitment criteria based on professionalism.  SIS 
remains, by law, the principal intelligence and security service of Albania.97 
New threats helped define the restructuring of the intelligence services.  
Besides the traditional foreign intelligence and counterintelligence organizations, the law 
provided the legal basis for building the new structures to face emerging threats such as 
international terrorism and organized crime.  In addition, the Service changed its structure 
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by adding new useful elements such as Counter-terrorism Center which plays a key role 
in the fight against terrorism, the Analysis Unit, which filters the information sent to the 
customers and also by establishing the NIS Institution which is another new element that 
greatly contributes to the preparation and training of the new cadres of intelligence 
operators that are selected from a considerable number of eligible applicants.    
The reforms increased the reliability of the intelligence services in the 
public eye, and improved cooperation and exchange of information amongst the NIS and 
its partner intelligence services.  The cooperation led to a number of successful joint 
operations in the domain of counter-terrorism, most notably operations mounted to take 
down the EIJ cell stationed in Tirana,98 the closure of some NGO’s connected to 
terrorism, and the freezing of Al-Qaeda assets.99 Additionally, the Albanian intelligence 
services, in particular SIS and MIS, contributed greatly during the Kosovo crisis.  
Despite this progress, this period is also marked by some problems that 
impacted the political arena and the service itself.  The events of 1997 showed the need 
for a more professional intelligence service.  To meet this need, the new leaders of the 
service began recruiting from the pool of ex-Sigurimi officers who were young enough 
and had not been implicated with the Communist Party.  As a result, the leaders relied on 
the ‘Commission for the Scrutiny of the Senior Officials’ for the vetting of all ex-
members of the OSS who would be hired.100 Notwithstanding the great efforts of the 
committee, some ex-directors and elements connected to the Communist regime were 
hired; a fact which rose concerns from both the opposition and foreign security 
partners.101As a consequence, the legacy of the old service employed within the current 
                                                 
98 See Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism Center, Terrorist Groups:  Egyptian Islamic Jihad 
[article online]; available from  
http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jtic/doc_view_events.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit/jwi
t0292.htm@current&Prod_Name=JWIT&QueryText=&group=Egyptian+Islamic+Jihad; Internet; accessed 
January 24, 2008. 
99 See The Albanian Legislation:  Orders of the Minister of Finance [website]; available from 
http://www.fint.gov.al/en/lshqiptar_faq2.htm; Internet; accessed January 24, 2008. 
100 Qendra e Botimeve Zyrtare (QBZ) [article online]; available from  
http://www.qpz.gov.al/doc.jsp?doc=docs/Ligj%20Nr%208280%20Datë%2015-01-1998.htm; Internet; 
accessed January 24, 2008. 
101 British Helsinki Human Rights Group. 
 36
SIS negatively served to raise skepticism and increase tensions between the service and 
the opposition.102 The tension stemmed from accusations that the service was monitoring 
leaders of the opposition, and it was believed that the service hired ex-Sigurimi officers to 
deal with the opposition. The service became the target of criticism by the opposition in 
September 1998 following the murder of an opposition member of parliament, a key 
figure in the opposing Democratic Party.  
The opposition pointed to structures of the government, including the 
leadership of the NIS, as masterminding the murder.  Therefore, the head of the 
government called for the resignation of the director of the SIS, but that request was 
objected to by the President of the Republic, who has the ultimate authority in accordance 
with the Constitution to approve or deny the Prime Minister’s proposal for dismissal.103 
The President of the Republic refused to dismiss the head of the service claiming that 
there were no strong reasons to do so.104 As a result, the conflict between the Prime 
Minister on one side, and the President of the Republic and the head of the service on the 
other side brought about some ‘independence’ for the service.  Both the Prime Minister 
and opposition parties accused the director of the service and his key co-workers (most of 
them were ex-Sigurimi leaders) of working for their own interests and the political groups 
who supported them.105 The situation worsened at the end of 2002 during the presidential 
elections.  Political parties on both ends of the political spectrum and the media accused 
the director of the service and its close collaborators of involvement in the presidential 
election process.  
Consequently, the two main political parties reached an agreement to 
consensually elect a president.  As a result, after the new president of the Albania was 
elected a special parliamentary committee was formed to investigate the role of the 
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service in domestic political life.106 The political consensus included the replacement of 
the head of the service and his principal allies.  Subsequently, the director of the service 
was substituted with a person who enjoyed the support of the entire Albanian political 
spectrum.107 After the assignment of the new consensual head of the intelligence service 
there has been obvious support from the political class which, in turn, has brought about 
legal support for the mission and role of the SIS.  Most of the related legislation 
introduced after this period has passed by consensus, and the services’ work is considered 
a positive contribution to the national interest and is conducted within the rule of law.   
b. Military Intelligence Service 
Albanian membership in NATO, PfP, and active participation in the global 
efforts against terrorism called for a reorganization of the Military Intelligence 
Service.108 After 1998, the MIS continuously faced structural changes.  In the framework 
of the reformation of the Armed Forces (AF) the J2 Directorate was established, and it 
had the assets of the MIS (Military Intelligence branch, the Analysis unit, and SIGINT 
Battalion) subordinated to it.  Although SIGINT was directly subordinated to the Army 
General Headquarters, it was managed by the J2 Directorate whose mission was to 
generate new intelligence tactical capabilities and security elements within the AF. 
A new Act, Number 9074 dated May 19, 2003 regarding the MIS was 
passed in the Albanian Parliament.  According to this legislation MIS was legally charged 
with data collection, analysis and management of information concerning activities 
threatening national security, and provision of assessments to Direction and Strategic 
Command on possible external and internal threats targeting the AF during the exercise 
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of its mission.109 The law was created in consult with foreign counterparts.  The prime 
minister issued an Order on July 3, 2005:  “The Functioning Regulation of MIS.” 
Objectivity, institutional interaction, respecting and protecting human rights and liberties 
were the basic principles summarizing the order. The legal framework pertaining to the 
MIS defined that all the activities of the MIS are supervised by parliament through the 
Parliamentary Committee on National Security, by the government, the Attorney 
General, and the country Ombudsman. 
The MIS structure is organised into the Operational Branch, composed of 
the Intelligence Collection unit, Counter intelligence and Counter Terrorism Service, 
Analysis and the Support Branch, and Training Centre.  The other side of the MOS 
structure is comprised of the Administration and other supportive structures.  Cooperation 
and coordination amongst the MIS, J2, and Military SIGINT is arranged by a separate 
Order of the Minister of Defense.  
2. Oversight of the Albanian Intelligence Community 
Oversight of the Albanian intelligence community has its primary legal reference 
ensconced in provisions of the Albanian Constitution.  The authority for oversight of the 
activities of the Albanian intelligence community is vested in several authorities 
including:  a) Legislative; b) Executive; c) Judiciary; and, d) public oversight.  
a. Legislative 
The role of Parliament in restructuring and overseeing the activities of the 
Intelligence community has been of fundamental importance.110  The Albanian 
parliament has passed a number of Acts related to the activity of the intelligence agencies 
to include structure, scope, interaction and coordination, data administration, work 
procedures, etc. This legislation has gone through periodic amendments and upgrades.  
The legal package now includes:  Law on SIS (8391/1998); MIS (9074/2003); Law No 
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8457 on November 2, 1999 “On information classified as ‘State Secret”; Law No 9157 
on December 4, 2003 “On Telecommunication Interception”; Law No 9357 on March 17, 
2005 “Status of the SIS Personnel”; Law of No 9295 on October 21, 2004 “Criteria of the 
recruitment, career and termination of work relations in MIS.” Furthermore, the National 
Security Strategy was passed by the Albanian parliament in December 2004 and is due to 
be revised this year.  It represents a foundation document leading the activity of all state 
entities including the intelligence community.111  
Parliament exercises its oversight through parliamentary committee whose 
members are vetted by the Classified Information National Office.  The oversight 
responsibilities of parliament include determining the legality of activities and audit of 
the budget allocated to the intelligence agencies.112 The Director of the SIS is required by 
law to report to the parliamentary committee at least once a year and any time required by 
the committee, and the committee determines the issues the SIS director must report 
about.  However, in practice the head of the SIS has been invited by the committee to 
report on specific issues more often than annually.  The committee conducts its oversight 
as well during budget considerations and when draft laws related to national security are 
presented.  The parliamentary committee may also undertake to oversee special cases of 
reported human rights violations. 
The investigatory committee that was set up to oversee the work of the 
SIS has a constitutional basis.  Article 77 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania 
stipulates that: “The Assembly has the right and, upon the request of one-fourth of its 
members is obliged, to designate investigatory parliamentary committees to review a 
particular issue.”113 Its conclusions are not binding in a court of law, but they may be 
made known to the office of the prosecutor, which evaluates them according to legal 
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procedures.  There are many democratic achievements in the provisions of this law: an 
investigatory committee can be established at the request of the opposition; the 
investigatory committee agrees to the request tabled by a member of the investigatory 
committee for investigation or collection of evidence without resorting to voting; and the 
minority's opinion is always attached to the final decision of the investigatory committee, 
which is made public. 
In July 2002, on the initiative of a group of opposition Members of 
Parliament (MP), the investigatory parliamentary committee on the State Intelligence 
Service was set up.  The scope of the activity of this committee was:  investigation into 
eavesdropping and surveillance, especially with regard to the opposition; investigation 
into the involvement of the SIS in the murder of opposition MP, Azem Hajdari; 
investigation into claims of financial abuse; and investigation into the relations between 
the SIS and the media.  The establishment of the first investigatory parliamentary 
committee to look into such a sensitive area as the secret service was a difficult 
parliamentary challenge.  At the end of the investigation, agreement was reached that the 
Chairman of the investigatory parliamentary committee should submit two reports to 
Parliament, potentially drawing diametrically opposed conclusions, but that expressed the 
opinions of the majority and minority in the investigatory parliamentary committee. 114 
After the election of 2005 Parliament has constituted the National Security 
Committee which is the oversight body that covers not only intelligence services, but also 
the Armed Forces and other issues related to national security.  There is a draft for the 
establishment of a parliamentary sub-committee consisting of fewer individuals that will 
be in charge of overseeing the intelligence community.  The parliamentary committee 
overseeing the activity of the intelligence services was hindered for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, parliament, like most state structures, was focused on issues they deemed most 
important, such as election and judicial reforms, and economic reforms.  Secondly, the 
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membership of the committee was politically motivated and its decision-making and 
scope was, in many cases, biased and based on political benefits.  Thirdly, the activity of 
the committee was also affected by the lack of interaction with the other parliamentary 
committees.  Fourthly, the level of access to information provided for the members of the 
Committee is not clearly defined.115 
b. Executive Oversight 
The SIS is accountable to the prime minister who appoints, by virtue of 
SIS basic law, an Inspector General who has the authority to conduct investigations and 
audits in the SIS as specified by the appropriate Acts.  The prime minister approves the 
SIS structure and its total number of personnel, as well as the MIS book of regulations.  
The Minister of Defense, through specially approved programs, periodically and for a 
specific concern may authorize one of his advisers to run investigations into MIS activity. 
The national Office of Classified Information is also related to the 
Intelligence Community oversight process and the Classified Information Security 
Directorate (CISD) which is under the Prime Minister’s authority.  CISD is the National 
Security Authority (NSA) that decides on the issue of the provision of Certificates of 
Security Clearance (CSC) to access classified national and NATO information to 
interested individuals.  The SIS and the MIS are the authorised structures to conduct the 
clearance of civilian and military personnel that apply to have a CSC, but they do not 
have the authority to decide who gets access.  Throughout the CSC procedure NSA is the 
authority that monitors and supervises the vetting process.  
The government determines the intelligence community collection foci by 
releasing Priority Information Requests (PIR).  PIR are annually approved by the Prime 
Minister for SIS interests and by the Minister of Defense for MIS interests.  Likewise, the 
government focuses the efforts of the intelligence community by adopting and approving 
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essential strategic policy documents such as the “National Strategy Against Drugs 2004-
2010” or the “Counter-Terrorism Action Plan.”116 
‘Internal control’ refers to the capacity of each agency for self-policing.  
SIS and MIS have established their own auditing teams.  The directors of SIS and MIS 
respectively approve the agenda of their auditing teams. 
c. Judicial Oversight 
Judicial oversight of the intelligence services is established in the 
Constitution and the laws relating to the intelligence services.  It is exercised by the 
Constitutional Court (for issues of constitutionality) and the Attorney General.  The 
Attorney General has responsibility for approving and checking all the procedures used in 
the routine conduct of intelligence work for both the SIS and the MIS including:  
electronic surveillance; appropriate forms of protecting methods and sources of 
counterintelligence and foreign intelligence from the unauthorized access; ways of 
verifying and corroborating sources of information; and collection of intelligence on 
individuals viewed as potential sources of information.  Interception is authorized or 
rejected by the Attorney General, who is also the authority that approves warrants for 
wiretaps requested by one of the agencies that have a legal right to conduct interception.  
The right to telecommunications interception lies with the Ministry of Interior, State 
Intelligence Service, Ministry of Defense and other law enforcement agencies, in order to 
gather information necessary to fulfill their legal duties.117  
Judicial oversight exists in law and on paper, but in reality it is not very 
effective; in large part because the judicial system in Albania has problems.  The judicial 
system is allegedly one of the most corrupt state institutions, which is problematic as its 
reformation is one of the two key conditions (the other is the reform of the electoral 
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process) that Albania requires for consideration of membership in NATO.118 Oversight 
from the Ombudsman is applicable only to the MIS.  The Ombudsman may oversee 
certain activities of the MIS, as authorized by the Minister of Defense.   
d. Public Oversight 
The media and civil society have also played an important role in 
overseeing the activity of the intelligence services.  The independent press has played a 
significant role in identifying the problems within the intelligence services.  It was the 
media that exposed the political mistakes that that NIS committed during 1996-1997, as 
well as in 2002 when the director of the NIS was implicated in politically motivated 
activities. Currently mass media is backing initiatives concerning public disclosure of the 
Sigurimi files.  However, Albania’s transition to democracy and the process of 
reformation of the intelligence services have proven to be less visible to the media and 
the public scrutiny.119 
E. CONCLUSION  
Albania has definitely parted from its previous ways and ‘secrecy psychosis,’ but 
it still has a long way to go to ensure that transparency becomes part of the intelligence 
services’ culture and institutionalized in practice. 
The reform in the leadership of the intelligence services played a positive role in 
the Albanian intelligence community, and it also served to consolidate the intelligence 
community.  The Albanian intelligence services have significantly improved their image 
within the public opinion, conveying the premise that their goal is national security.  All 
these efforts, together with the positive results that the services have achieved in fighting 
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terrorism120 and cooperating with the US, EU,121 and NATO partners,122 have all 
contributed to significant improvements in the general regard that civil society has for 
them.  
The current leaders of both the SIS and the MIS have emphasized that 
professionalism of their personnel is at the top of the recruitment and training policies. 
Similarly, the Act “Status of the SIS Personnel,” which defines that the service is not part 
of the military, and the Law “On Criteria of the Employment, Career and Termination of 
the Work Relationship with MIS” provide a strong basis for the positive progress on 
professionalization of the both services.  
The intelligence reform process in Albania has not been easy.  Critics argue that 
the cultural legacy from the former-Communist regime remains in place, and that there is 
no genuine civilian, democratic control.  Others argue that reform has occurred, that the 
new services have transformed themselves from their Communist past and are effectively 
under civilian control.  But the reality regarding reform and democratic control of the 
Albanian intelligence services is somewhere in between; it is beyond the end of the first 









                                                 
120 See U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Terrorism, “Country Reports:  Europe and 
Eurasia Overview, Albania,” available from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82732.htm; Internet; 
accessed January 26, 2008. 
121 European Union, “European Commission (EC), Albania: 2006 Progress Report,” 8 November 
2006; available from  http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/al_sec_1383_en.pdf; 
Internet; accessed January 26, 2008. 
122 See “Albania’s Preparation for NATO Membership,” available from 
http://www.nato.cz/english/clenove/albanie.html; Internet; accessed January 26, 2008. 
 45
IV. ROMANIA CASE STUDY:  GOOD EXPERIENCE  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Similar to other former-Communist countries, Romania has commenced social 
reforms aimed at bringing the state in line with democratic standards.  An essential part 
of these reforms was the transformation of the security services, with the primary purpose 
of bringing them under civilian control and ensuring their activities are maintained within 
the purview of law.  Based on their history, reform of the intelligence services was more 
sensitive than in other fields, but it also yielded some of the best results.  The intelligence 
services, once persona non grata in post-Communist Romanian society, have 
surprisingly made a radical change and have become some of the more trusted state 
institutions.123 Among many factors, two played a crucial role in the successful reform of 
Romanian intelligence services:  first, it was the strong desire of Romanian society to 
become members of NATO and the EU, because of this civil society played a decisive 
role in pushing the political elite to carry on with the democratic transformation of the 
intelligence services; and second, there were the lessons learned from other nations’ 
experiences in attaining membership in the EU and NATO.  Intelligence reform was a 
joint venture amongst Romania’s elected authorities, the intelligence organizations, civil 
society, the media, and the international community. 
This chapter will discuss the Romanian experience of reforming its intelligence 
services and includes:  the challenges that Romanian society faced; how they conducted 
the reform of the intelligence services; what experience was gained from recently-
admitted NATO and EU members; and, what role external forces have played in 
achieving their positive results. 
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B. THE COMMUNIST PERIOD AND THE SECURITY SERVICES 
After the Second World War, Romania, like other CEEC, remained under 
Communist influence.  In Romania this was materialized as an authoritarian Communist 
regime where the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) was the only legal political party 
formed around the cult of personality that was Dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, and extended 
to his family members.  Like other Communist regimes, they did not trust the previous 
institutions, so they razed them and created their own.  The PCR and the dictator 
Ceausescu maintained absolute power over all aspects of the leadership of the country 
and its institutions, including the country’s intelligence services, which were utilized as 
the key elements for the regime to control the country and maintain political power.  
The structure of the Romanian intelligence services during this period was created 
by the establishment of the Department of the State Security (DSS) and the  Department 
of External Information (DIE).  The DSS, commonly known as the ‘Securitate’ was the 
Ceausescu regimes’ political police; and the regime frequently employed them 
mercilessly to impose Communist rule and coerce society.124 The service was organized 
in 1948 to defend the Communist regime.  Originally the Securitate was created as a 
paramilitary force entrusted to watch over the internal security of the Ceausescu regime 
and to crush any social unrest, political movements, opposition, or dissident group that 
criticized or contradicted the government.125 
DSS was similar to other Communist intelligence organizations during the Cold 
War; it operated against both imaginary and real “enemies” of the regime without regard 
for any objective framework for analysis or assessment.  The service played a central role 
in intimidating, torturing, imprisoning, confiscating and murdering enemies of the 
totalitarian regime. Securitate was successful in instilling a fear within the country’s 
population by using the visible presence of officers, but this was only an infinitesimal 
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element of an omnipresent network of officers, agents, informers, and collaborators who 
were busy monitoring the general population.  At that time Romania was a “paranoid 
state that forced friend to spy on friend, lovers to betray each other to police, and 
informants to scour poems for signs of subversion.”126 
The other service, the Department of External Information, established with 
Soviet assistance in the mid-1950s, was Romania’s principal organization focusing on 
foreign intelligence.  The service had a mission to conduct clandestine intelligence 
activities outside Romania.  These activities included technological espionage, 
disinformation to promote Romania’s national interests and foreign policies, and 
monitoring the activities of exiled dissidents opposing Ceausescu’s regime.127 DIE 
officers were given duties to commit terrorist acts and assassinate selected agitators living 
in foreign Diaspora.128  
The fall of the USSR had a significant impact in Romanian society.  On 21 
December 1989, the discontent against Ceausescu and Communism in general led to a 
mass revolt.  Ceausescu attempted to escape an angry populace, but was arrested and 
executed after a brief trial marking the end of his dictatorship; this set Romania on a 
national path toward democracy.  The new authorities of the Council of the National 
Salvation Front (CFSN) shut down the wiretapping and recording centers, opened records 
to public inspection, and outlawed the interception of private communications – a 
provision that remained in force until July 1991.
 
On 26 December, the Securitate was 
transferred from the Interior Ministry to an unsympathetic Defense Ministry, and military 
forces took the control of the DSS, including of its all files and reports.  Four days later, 
on 30 December 1989, the Securitate was entirely disbanded. 
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Deactivation of the political security service had an important role during the 
initial period of Romania’s transition from dictatorship to democracy, not only for 
deterring elements still loyal to the regime, but also for the overall success of the regime 
change.  Dismantling and putting the Securitate under military control was determined to 
be a necessary step that CFSN took to help end up the civil war between pro-Communist 
and pro-democratic factions.  
The transformation of Romania’s post-Communist society has endured its share 
of ups and downs.  This difficult period was finalized with the realization of the 
Romanian people’s dream to be part of the European Union and NATO.  This process has 
undergone four distinct phases:129 1990-1991, the first phase was characterized by 
uncertainty and insecurity; 1991-1996, the second phase was characterized by the 
building of new institutions and establishing legitimate legal basis; 1997-2000, the third 
phase focused on fulfilling of the requests of NATO’s summits in Madrid and 
Washington; and 2001-present, the final phase is characterized by continuation of reform 
and anti-corruption measures and NATO and EU membership.130 
C. BUILDING THE NEW INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM  
The need for intelligence services was generally recognized by the newly-formed 
transitional government and they were not willing to risk duplicating the Securitate 
experience by quickly reconstituting a security intelligence agency.  But a number of 
events that threatened the state’s national security, such as ethnic unrest in two 
neighboring counties with large Hungarian monitories, made the requirement to establish 
an intelligence system both important and timely.  On the other hand, the construction of 
a single intelligence service was not palatable, particularly considering the poor 
reputation of the Securitate through the course of the former Communist regime.  
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Ultimately, the government made a decision to divide the former intelligence services 
into several agencies with their legal basis founded in the Romanian Constitution and the 
Law of National Security Number 51 of 1991.131 Initially Romania established at least 
nine agencies on the ruins of the former Securitate, but would eventually reduce them to 
six services.132 Throughout this reform, the fundamental premise of civilian democratic 
control over the new intelligence community was seen as the guarantee for this process.  
1. The Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) 
The SRI was established by Decree 181 of 26 March 1990, and given a statutory 
basis under Law Number 14 of 1992, “Organization and Functioning of the Romanian 
Intelligence Service.” The law states that “SRI organizes and conducts activities of 
gathering, checking and utilizing intelligence for the identification, prevention and 
counteracting of actions that may, according to the law, endanger the national security of 
Romania.”133 The SRI has collection and analysis capabilities and is also the main 
agency responsible for the protection of intelligence and counterintelligence.  The SRI, 
under law, is the primary agency with responsibilities in the counter-terrorism field and 
represents the National Authority for Countering Terrorism, heads the Counter-Terrorism 
Operational Coordination Center (an inter-agency body), and develops the National 
Strategy for Countering and Preventing Terrorism.  Other primary duties of the SRI 
include its fight against organized crime and trans-border risks (trafficking).134 
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2. The Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) 
The Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) was stood up in January 1990, and is 
regulated by Law Number 1 of 1998 concerning the “Organization and Functioning of 
the Foreign Intelligence Service.” The service has the mission to collect and analyze 
“political, economic, social, ecologic, and strategic factors originating from abroad, 
which threaten the national security of Romania.”135 
3. The Service for Protection and Guard (SPP) 
The SPP was set up on 7 May 1990 under Decree 204 of the Provisional Council 
of National Unity and its primary role is to protect the Romanian President, Romanian 
political party leaders, and foreign diplomats on national territory.  The SPP is permitted 
“to organize and carry out activities of gathering, checking and using necessary 
intelligence to fulfill its responsibilities.”136 
4. The Special Telecommunications Service (STS) 
The Special Telecommunication Service (STS) was created in 1996, under 
Government Resolution 229 of 27 May 1993.  The legal framework states that the STS is 
the primary intelligence agency to focus on special telecommunications with a mission 
“to administer, operate and develop…and manage and ensure protection” of the special 
telecommunications networks.” 137 
5. The Defense General Information Agency (DGIA) 
Defense General Information Agency (DGIA) as established by the Emergency 
Ordinance Number 14 of 26 January 2001.  DGIA is a “specialized structure of the MOD 
responsible for the collection, processing, and verification of intelligence regarding 
internal and external, military and non-military risk factors to the national security.”  The 
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service is subordinated to the Ministry of Defense; thus, all its responsibilities are 
approved by the Minister of Defense.138 It also manages intelligence with regard to the 
operational theaters where Romanian troops are deployed and is involved in counter-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.139 
6. The General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection 
(DGIPI) 
DGIPI is the specialized intelligence agency of the Minister of Internal Affairs 
and Administration (MOI).  The service was stood up on 1 February 1990 as the Counter-
intelligence department of the Ministry of the Interior, originally known as UM 0215, and 
in June 1990 was given a legal framework.140 In 1998 UM 0215 was restructured and 
underwent a significant personnel reduction due to significant criticism from the media, 
NGOs, and Western governments regarding the employment of ex-Securitate.  In 1999 it 
was renamed UM 0962 and placed under the General Directorate for Intelligence and 
Internal Protection (DGIPI), which now consists of two bodies and has legal 
responsibilities for the collection and use of intelligence with regard to organized crime, 
political or social violence (riots), and counter-intelligence protection of MOI personnel.  
MOI also possesses an Intervention and Special Actions Service (as part of the General 
Police Inspectorate) which is designed to take direct action against organized criminal 
groups.141 
D. OVERSIGHT AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL STRUCTURES 
The second step that the Romanian government undertook in the process of 
reform was to implement legislation to ensure civilian oversight and control over the 
intelligence agencies.  Democratic control of the intelligence services was carefully 
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stipulated in a solid legal framework based on the Romanian Constitution.  The main 
actors that exert this control are the legislative and the executive bodies, but other forms 
of control, such as judicial or public, are also noteworthy. 
1. Legislative Oversight 
Since the collapse of the Communist system, the Romanian Parliament assumed 
all responsibilities concerning the legal framework on intelligence.  It is Parliament that 
approves or amends the laws relating to numerous facets of the intelligence services.  
First, by establishing the intelligence agencies and defining their roles and missions.  
Second, by creating the National Supreme Defense Council (CSAT), the most important 
executive body that coordinates, organizes and directs activities in the security sector.  
Third, by providing the statutory laws of the autonomous intelligence agencies; 
specifying their missions, roles and their overall organizational charts.  Fourth, by 
approving the essential strategic policy, the ‘National Security Strategy.’ And fifth, by 
approving the head of the SRI (the largest intelligence agency), whose nomination must 
be approved by the two chambers of Parliament (House of Deputies and Senate), after 
presidential recommendation. 
Legislative oversight of the intelligence agencies is carried out through the 
Committees for Defense, Public Order and National Security in both chambers of the 
Parliament which form specialized committees.  Each chamber of Parliament has its own 
permanent Commission for Defense, Public Order and National Security, to which all 
intelligence agencies are accountable.  Moreover, the most important intelligence 
agencies, the SRI and the SIE, are each monitored through Joint Standing Committees for 
Exercising Parliamentary Control of the SRI and the SIE, respectively; these committees 
exist in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.  
The oversight committees have the following duties:  to verify constitutional and 
legal compliance of the intelligence services’ activities;  to investigate allegations of 
illegal intelligence collections,  to conduct hearings on the presidential nominees for 
director positions; to assess the directors’ annual reports; to request data from the 
intelligence agencies (unless it jeopardizes the operations, identities of agents, sources, or 
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methods); to investigate the directors of the agencies and their staffs; and conduct 
unannounced visits to the services, to which the services are required to grant full access 
to data, personnel, etc.142  
Parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services is carried out in compliance 
with the Constitution’s provisions that ministerial heads be held accountable to 
Parliament.  Additionally, one particular component of parliamentary oversight over the 
ministerial intelligence services is control over their budgets.  During their investigative 
work, the parliamentary committees have not only uncovered illegal activities conducted 
by the services, but they have also made suggestions to improve the legal framework to 
help prevent future occurrences of such illegal activities.  
Problems that parliamentary oversight committees have faced in their work are 
manifold.  The state does not view the oversight issue as a primary duty; thus, insufficient 
time is dedicated to performing oversight.  As well, most parliamentarians lack 
experience in intelligence matters, and oversight committee members are often selected 
based on their political affiliation rather than their professional merits.  The process is 
further obfuscated by poor cooperation and coordination amongst parties, and there are 
issues of trust and confidence to contend with between committees and the services.  
2. Executive Oversight 
In Romania, the supreme executive institution that exercises control of 
intelligence is the National Supreme Defense Council (CSAT), a specialized central body 
that organizes and coordinates all intelligence activities.  The National Defense Supreme 
Council was created by Law Number 39 of 13 December 1990 to ensure the unified 
coordination of all activities pertaining to defense and state security.143 The CSAT 
consists of the President (chair), Prime Minister (vice-chair), the Ministers for Industry, 
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Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs, the President’s National Security Advisor, the SRI 
and SIE directors, and the Chief of the General Staff. Upon invitation by the President of 
Romania, the Chairmen of the two parliamentary chambers, the Governor of the National 
Bank, the heads of the other intelligence agencies (including the departmental agencies), 
and the chairmen of the  parliamentary specialized committees may participate in CSAT 
meetings. t is responsible for coordinating SRI, SIE, and SPP activities, and council 
members are empowered to decide on collection policies as well as to regulate the 
information flow throughout the intelligence community.144 
3. Judicial Oversight 
The Romanian Constitution and the 1991 National Security Law had established 
judicial oversight; however, judicial oversight is generally limited in practice to the 
consideration and issuing of warrants for technical surveillance that infringe on civil 
rights and liberties. 145 
4. Public and Media Oversight 
The Media in Romania have played a significant role in overseeing the 
intelligence community and forcing reform.  The press and civil society have held the 
government and the intelligence services to very high standards regarding democratic 
control, transparency, and requirements for integration within NATO and the EU.146 
E. INTELLIGENCE AND INTEGRATION INTO NATO AND THE EU 
When Romania was excluded from the first NATO enlargement in June 1997, 
several allies, most notably the United States and the United Kingdom argued that 
Romania still had a long way to go before it could be seen as sufficiently Western-like 
(liberal democratic) to be eligible for admission into the Euro-Atlantic Security 
                                                 
144 Larry L. Watts, “Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania,” DCAF Working 
Paper No. 111 [article online]; available from  http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Working_Papers/111.pdf; 
Internet; accessed December 29, 2007. 
145 Ibid.  
146 Matei, 234. 
 55
organization.147 Among the reforms, the intelligence reform was regarded as one of the 
most important.  The reform had the objective of balancing the need for intelligence to 
meet new threats and challenges to national and international security, as well as aligning 
the intelligence community to democratic values.  NATO and EU membership has been 
viewed by Romania as a proof of its departure from its former-Communist ways, and 
from Russian influence.   This is commonly regarded as a return to the Western values 
and standards that Romanian society aspired to before the Communist era. 
Maintaining momentum for continuing to reform intelligence services in Romania 
with the objective of consolidating democratic values was neither an easy nor a quick 
process.  Reform faces many challenges such as the existence of many intelligence 
agencies; overlapping responsibilities; rivalries amongst services; too much secrecy or 
lack of transparency; undemocratic control; politicization of intelligence organizations; 
and poor human resource management.148  But the main obstacle was the legacy of the 
past, the Securitate and its personnel.149 
F. STEPS TO CONSOLIDATION 
The Romanian political class acted in the concert with the desire to fulfill national 
interests related to attaining NATO and EU membership.  These efforts were sped up by 
NATO’s and EU’s membership requirements to candidate members as well as by the 
need to adequately respond to new security threats.  
First, the Romanian government acted to establish the legal framework that has 
led to a redefinition of the roles and missions of the intelligence agencies, a strengthening 
of interagency cooperation and information sharing. Parliament enacted the National 
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Security Law of 1991, as well as the main legislation on the organization and function of 
each intelligence agency with a view to defining mandates and structures for the 
intelligence organizations.  In 2001 the government amended the national security 
strategy to fit the post-9/11 security environment.  The strategy has been revised on a 
regular basis, for instance, the last revision took place in the spring of 2006; thus ensuring 
feedback from policymakers.150 The Romanian parliament also passed legislation on 
countering terrorism and combating organized crime which led to the new “National 
Anti-Terrorism Strategy.” In the international forum the Romanian government ratified 
all twelve United Nations counter terrorism conventions, as well as all the relevant 
international conventions on issues related to organized crime.151  
Due to NATO’s request for fulfilling the standards in November 2002, the 
government enacted the Emergency Ordinance Number 153 on Protection of Classified 
Information and created the National Registry Office for Classified Information 
(ORNISS) by Emergency Ordinance Number 153 to issue both national and NATO 
security clearances.  ORNISS has two bodies, the Office of the National Registry of State 
Secret Information and the National Authority for Security. 
The Second step that the Romanian government took to increase the effectiveness 
of the intelligence community and bring it in line with democratic standards was the 
creation of a new intelligence committee in Romania.  2005 brought the establishment of 
a National Intelligence Community (CNI), functioning under the National Defense 
Supreme Council (CSAT).  CNI is the lead agency created to both balance and channel 
competition amongst the Romanian intelligence services with a view to enhancing inter-
agency cooperation and intelligence sharing.  On the other hand, by 2006 the Romanian 
Government reduced the number of the intelligence agencies to six.  Now Romania has 
independent agencies including the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI); the Foreign 
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Intelligence Service (SIE); the Guard and Protection Service (SPP) and the Special 
Telecommunication Service (STS); and ministerial agencies include the General 
Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection (DGIPI) and the Directorate for 
General Information of the Army (DGIA).  The Romanian government subordinated its 
intelligence gathering agencies under the MOD during the early 2000s and eliminated the 
MOJ’s intelligence agency, DGPA, in 2006 due to pressure from the EU.152 
The third step undertaken by the Romanian government was the consolidation of 
democratic control over the intelligence services.  The legislative control by parliament 
has increased its role by reconstructing the legal framework governing the intelligence 
services as well as structural changes to the intelligence community; these reforms have 
resulted in attaining democratic oversight standards, Parliamentary approval and ultimate 
control of the intelligence budget, and the attribution of other residual powers that the 
Romanian Constitution gives to it.  Hence, the specialized committees are the essential 
legislative bodies that exercise parliamentary control.153   
Both chambers of Parliament, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, have their 
own Permanent Commissions for Defense, Public Order, and National Security.  While 
they have included in the membership of their Committees people with experience in the 
intelligence field in order to increase their effectiveness, this also served to decrease the 
politicization of the services’ work.  Further, these Committees are conducted in a 
partisan manner where opposition parties have a presence.154 A new organization, the 
National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives Executive (CNSAS), which 
fulfills other requirements for EU membership, may be considered a ‘watchdog’ hired by 
parliament.155  Executive control of the intelligence services is significantly more 
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organized that ever before, and has included numerous new structures.  Besides the 
CSAT, new structures such as CNI and ORNISS are working in this field.  The 
Constitutional Court, the Attorney General, and the Courts of Justice exercise juridical 
control of the intelligence services.  Civil society and the media have also played an 
important role in increasing the standards regarding democratic control, transforming the 
legal framework, and reconstructing the intelligence community in order to fulfill 
European Union and Euro-Atlantic integration requirements.156    
The efforts made to develop professional intelligence services constitute the last 
step.  At the national level, Romania has established the National Intelligence Academy 
(NIA) and the High National Security College (HNSC).  The HNSC provides lessons 
regarding security and intelligence issues to public authorities, parliamentarians, other 
intelligence agencies, and civil society.  Furthermore, other intelligence agencies have 
specialized training units, whose programs, like NIA and HNSC, rely heavily on NATO 
and Western curricula and teaching expertise.157 
All these steps together have given Romania the opportunity to significantly 
reform their intelligence services in accordance with similar Western institutions.  They 
helped to do away with the Securitate legacy, they made the functions of the Romanian 
intelligence agencies meet democratic standards, and they increased the effectiveness of 
the Romanian intelligence services.  Perhaps what is most significant is that these steps 
have made the intelligence services compatible for international membership before the 
remainder of Romanian institutions.158 
G. CONCLUSION 
The process of transformation of the intelligence services from their Communist 
roots to meeting new democratic standards has passed through two phases.  The first 
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phase consisted of establishing new institutions and was characterized by breaking with 
the legacy of the old services, and their impact on Romania’s integration into the EU and 
NATO.  The second phase was a result of the general efforts of Romanian civil society 
and the new political leadership. Intelligence reform made possible not only the 
consolidation of the new institutions within the intelligence sector, but it also helped them 
become a more professional and effective community, not only in Romania, but in the 
international intelligence community. 159 The participation of Romania in international 
endeavors to fight terrorism and organized crime has proven useful in the development 
and transformation of their intelligence services. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. THE CONSOLIDATION EFFORTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND ROAD 
AHEAD 
The process of consolidating democracy and the integration into NATO and the 
EU embraces numerous reforms that cover almost all aspects of society, replacing the 
legacy of the totalitarian Communist regime with a new legacy; one fit for a consolidated 
western democratic society.  
The international community, notably the EU and NATO, has supported and 
encouraged all candidate countries to follow the democratic reform processes in the 
security sector, especially in the security and intelligence services as the intelligence 
services are simultaneously necessary for democracy and a threat to democracy.160 The 
EU and NATO are also looking ahead to the third round of enlargement, and the scholars 
believe that the problems identified within the intelligence services of the former-
Communist countries recently invited to join will pale in comparison to those of the next 
round of states to be invited to join.161 
Intelligence reform is undoubtedly a very important process and each country has 
to choose the most suitable and practical way to carry it out.  Fundamentally, there are 
some common values that need to be shared and subscribed to.  It is also understandable 
that the reform of the intelligence sector in every country is a difficult process, especially 
in those countries having had typical authoritarian and Communist regimes where the 
intelligence services were identified with the regimes themselves:  it poses a challenge 
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with many unknown difficulties and no clear road map.162 In order to protect new 
democratic achievements and a nations’ reputation, the reformation and transformation 
process of the intelligence services in those countries must be conducted properly and 
with transparency. Meanwhile, this reform cannot be achieved in isolation and separated 
from the experiences of other states that have already undergone these transformations.  
Their practices will show the problems and difficulties that they have experienced; also, 
they offer us the opportunity to learn and benefit from their best practices and 
achievements with a view to avoiding their mistakes or missteps taken in the process of 
security sector reform. 
In the Romanian case, the evaluation of the new intelligence service during the 
transition process from a totalitarian regime into a NATO and EU member is a successful 
example that shows how the political elite and the intelligence community have resolved 
many problems.  In the Romanian experience we also note the important role that 
international institutions (i.e. NATO and the EU) played in motivating the Romanian 
political class to meet the democratic standards concerning the intelligence services.  The 
Romanian government strongly supported policies to progress the reform process and the 
performance of intelligence services as required by the NATO and EU standards. 
The role of civil society, the media, and NGOs were indispensable in this process, 
reflecting both the eagerness and desire to attain the ultimate goal of the Romanian 
people - to reform all institutions, including the intelligence community, in accordance 
with democratic principles.  This difficult journey was achieved by overcoming 
significant obstacles and getting rid of the legacy of the Communist intelligence services; 
by doing so, the Romanian people made their dream of joining NATO and the EU come 
true.   
In the Albanian case, intelligence reform is part of the democratic transformation 
process of society as a whole, and has taken steps both back and forth in a way reflective 
of the experiences and a mentality inherited from the past. The politicization of the 
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services in different periods, and the insufficient democratic oversight of the process 
were two key elements which negatively impacted the transformation process of the 
intelligence services.  Although progress is noted, the old legacy of the intelligence 
services remains one of the greatest obstacles for the road ahead and requires decisive 
action from the entire political spectrum, including both parliament and the government.  
Failures and mistakes committed during the initial phase of the intelligence services’ 
restructuring and reformation may recur throughout the ongoing process as well.  
Intelligence reform requires a special focus and is one of the main targets of democratic 
transformation provided that intelligence is an important and sensitive element of SSR.   
The ongoing phase of SSR coincides with major political developments in the 
country, most notably the invitation for Albania to join NATO in early April 2008 and 
the implementation of standards to join the EU that are tightly bound with the second 
phase of the SSR (relating to the reform of the intelligence services and its democratic 
oversight and control structures).  The reform of the intelligence community calls for the 
consensus of a vast political spectrum, a consensus that has been evident with the recent 
election and judicial reforms set forth as pre-conditions for the admission of Albania to 
NATO and accession to EU due course. 
The reformation of the SIS, the principal intelligence service in the country, is 
also dictated by the changes in the security environment, emergence of new internal and 
external threats such as international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and organized 
crime networks, etc.  The same situation applies to the Military Intelligence Agency, 
given the activity of the Albanian military abroad (the Albanian military is currently 
deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina) under both NATO 
and UN auspices.  The current structure and status of the intelligence community can not 
cope with these future threats unless they continue to evolve. 
As mentioned above, reforms in the intelligence services also call for 
contributions by, and participation from, all of the relevant levers such as legislative, 
executive, judiciary, and civil society.  It is requisite that Albanian politicians work 
closely with Albanian civil society and take advantage of the expertise offered by  
prestigious and specialized international and national institutions, and Non-Profitable 
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Organizations (NPO), such as the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces; the Federation of the American Scientists; the Institute for Democracy and 
Mediation; the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the United States Naval 
Postgraduate School, etc.; all of which are willing to assist in this process.  As well, it is 
worthy to note that both NATO and the EU have redoubled their commitment to assist in 
reforming Albanian intelligence and security structures as well as its legal framework to 
reflect the NATO and EU norms. 
B. RECOMMENDATION  
The current trend of democratic progress in Albanian society calls for the 
immediate reformation of the Albanian intelligence community that will positively 
contribute to the effectiveness and implementation of the priorities of the Albanian state 
to the benefit of Albanian society.  The process of reformation should consist primarily of 
the adjustment of the role and mission of the intelligence services; and, to ensure proper 
oversight, improvements and amendments of the existing legal framework are required.  
These reforms should be carried out systematically with a view to attaining the standards 
of the Euro-Atlantic democratic nations’ intelligence services, with adjustments to meet 
the specific circumstances of Albania.  
Reformation calls for contributions from all powers, but particularly legislative 
reform through the parliament.  The intelligence services should have a clear mandate 
where their role is clearly articulated and approved by three levels of state power – the 
executive leadership, the elected legislative body, and the judiciary.  Likewise, based on 
past experience, the consent of civil society is also an important consideration. 
Intelligence reform should also determine the number and size of intelligence 
services required in the country:  considerations should include threat level, risk 
assessment, size of the population, budget considerations, etc.  Experience has shown that 
due to lack of coordination at senior levels, the mandates of the intelligence services have 
overlapped, consequently wasting manpower and finances; this issue must be considered 
by lawmakers and policymakers throughout the reformation process.    
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Democratic control of the intelligence services has thus far been neglected, and 
has to be updated in accordance with the best of practices of established democratic 
countries.  It is essential as a mean of helping to ensure the activities of the intelligence 
services are confined within a legal framework.  It is a matter of fact that many 
intelligence services in both old and new democratic societies have become targets of 
criticism for applying procedures that have been considered to constitute violations of 
fundamental human rights and liberties.  For this reason judiciary control must be clear 
and explicitly incorporated in the legal acts related to intelligence services.  The 
intelligence services must comply with the law and they must be held accountable to civil 
society and its appropriate levers on a need-to-know basis. Transparency to the public 
positively contributes to the image of the intelligence services, given their poor reputation 
inherited from former regimes.  
Throughout the reformation process special focus should be paid to the new 
cadre’s recruitment processes and the provision of updated professional training to the 
existing personnel employed in the intelligence services.  The entire reformation process 
should aim at creating a strong basis for a professional intelligence community serving 
the national security of the country and contributing to the aspiration of the Albanian 
society to do away with the prolonged democratic transition and integrate itself in the 
Euro-Atlantic bodies.  It also needs to identify potential leaders and managers and to 
evolve capacity building mechanisms and career promotions systems with a view to  
successfully accomplishing assigned goals and missions, as well as to ensure the optimal 
performance and positive legacy of the intelligence services. 
1. Legal Improvements  
Little is mentioned about the intelligence agencies in the current Albanian 
Constitution wherein it is simply cited that the President of the Republic appoints and 
dismisses the head of the SIS upon the proposal of the Prime Minister.  Given the 
essential changes that have influenced the security environment, the emergence of new 
threats and risks, it is an immediate necessity that legislation concerning both services, 
the SIS and the MIS, require either profound amendment or the creation of new Acts in 
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order to make the services more efficient and compliant.  The new legal framework must 
be sufficiently robust enough overcome the mistakes and errors committed thus far, and 
must anticipate future developments and changes:  it should also reflect the substance and 
extent of the term ‘national security’ that have changed, and will continue to change, in 
the future security environment.   
Although the current legislative Act concerning the SIS was developed in consult 
with well-regarded individuals in the area of law and has undergone some minor 
periodical amendments, the current legal framework appears to be relatively outdated.  
The Act grants the service a mission that focuses primarily on domestic affairs and, in 
many ways, lacks flexibility and limits the scope of its activity.  The SIS Act approved in 
1998 primarily aimed at narrowing the competencies of the organization, stressing the de-
politicization of the service.  The MIS basic law differed from the SIS Act in this respect; 
however, it lacked long-term vision and did not consider future developments.   As such, 
it is not very compatible with the recently approved Strategy of Defense.  Aside from the 
basic Acts of the intelligence services, a number of other Acts related to the intelligence 
services must be amended as well.  
2. Parliamentary Oversight  
Parliament, whose role has been enhanced in the current constitution, represents 
the most important institution relating to democratic control.  Likewise, Parliament 
approves strategic policy on national security, the budget, and it exerts parliamentary 
control over activities connected to the intelligence services.  Parliament has exercised its 
oversight of the intelligence community through periodical reporting of the heads of the 
services to the Parliamentary Committee on National Security, ad-hoc Parliamentary 
committees, Investigative Committees, and with respect to budgetary accountability. 
In many cases, individuals involved in the oversight bodies have not been experts 
in the security and intelligence field; therefore, the establishment of a Parliamentary Sub-
Committee whose membership must come from the Parliamentary Committee on 
National Security is deemed necessary.  
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3. Executive Tasking and Oversight 
Given the direct dependency of the intelligence services upon the government, the 
latter has an indispensable role regarding tasking, control and oversight.  The head of the 
government determines the priorities of SIS while for MIS he acts through the minister of 
Defense.  The Prime Minister is also head of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for National 
Security, and his advisor on national security has traditionally led the joint working group 
responsible for drafting the National Security Strategy, the principal document addressing 
security issues in the country.  Currently the National Security Strategy is somewhat 
vague and does not clearly elucidate the role of the intelligence services.  At present the 
distinction between the responsibilities of the President of the Republic, as the overall 
head of the National Security Council, and those of the Prime Minister, as the head of the 
Inter-ministerial Committee for National Security, are unclear.  Moreover, both bodies 
have advisory authority rather than decision making authority and, in some ways, their 
activities appear to overlap each other.  
It recommended that a Cabinet Committee for Security and Intelligence Affairs be 
established under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s office. Further, this Committee 
should be provided with the authority to coordinate the activities and efforts of 
intelligence agencies, and responsibility for oversight of the dissemination of the 
intelligence agencies’ finished products to the appropriate governmental entities.   
It is also recommended that a National Intelligence Coordination body be 
established, whose membership must consist of the heads of the intelligence services and 
other authorities from governmental bodies related to these issues.  This new structure 
will contribute to the executive control and supervision of the intelligence and security 
services, would serve as an interim body between the policy makers and the intelligence 
services, and would be the center for the coordination of intelligence activities in the 
country and produce the Executive Intelligence Assessment on behalf of the entire 
intelligence community. 
The government has oversight authority over the intelligence services.  According 
to current legislation, the Prime Minister appoints an Inspector General who may run 
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investigations on specific issues related to the activities of the SIS, although his authority 
is not well delineated as the head of the government oversees the activities of MIS 
through the cabinet.  The Minister of Defense has also appointed an Inspector for the 
service to run investigations.  The role and the mission of these inspectors should be 
defined by law.  The government also has full authority to carry out audits on intelligence 
services’ budget issues as well, although these responsibilities and requirements should 
be better defined. 
4. Judiciary Supervision 
Although it is clearly defined in the existing Acts that the General Prosecution 
Office is in charge of approving and overseeing means and methods applied by 
intelligence services to implement their tasking, this has resulted in disagreements over 
interpretation of intent and circumstance.  This has been most common on cases 
involving phone interceptions; therefore, laws relating to interception need to be updated.  
It is also unclear exactly how the rules and legislation regarding the use of information 
generated by intelligence services are to be applied as evidence in prosecution.  
5. Press and Civil Society 
Experience has shown that intelligence services in Albania have not been 
sufficiently transparent and accountable to the public, and that has negatively contributed 
to the image of the services by unnecessarily making them targets of criticism.  It is very 
important that the reformation process consider that public transparency is essential for 
the consolidation and credibility of the services.  The intelligence services must convey 
the principle that they consistently execute their tasking while respecting fundamental 
human rights and liberties.  
6. Intelligence Services Structure 
Regarding the structure of the intelligence services, the reformation must consider 
the best fit for the circumstances.  Surveys of the structures of intelligence services in a 
number of democratic societies reveal that they have split domestic and foreign services 
 69
into two separate bodies, and in relatively few others examples they are both incorporated 
in one service.  Given Albania’s circumstances, a small country with limited resources, it 
appears practical to maintain the existing intelligence services with some slight changes 
to their structure, role and mission, and, in particular, their personnel and budget 
allocations to avoid overlap and to increase their effectiveness and efficiency.   
7. Professionalism of the Albanian Intelligence Services 
The intelligence services have benefited significantly from training programs of 
all types provided by potential liaison counterparts, conducted both domestically and 
abroad.  Selection of the candidates to be trained has not been proper, since many of 
those trained personnel were affected by periodical personnel changes during this 
transition period. Although there is an existing legal framework related to intelligence 
service personnel career promotion, reality has shown it is not consistently applied.  The 
SIS school in charge of providing basic and updated training for most of the intelligence 
personnel in the country also needs to be reformed by applying more contemporary 
methodology and curricula.  
Regarding the process of the consolidation of democratic society and integration 
into NATO and the EU, Albanians need to take note of all the changes that have occurred 
both inside and outside of the country, and learn from the experience of other countries; 
thus, taking steps toward removing the legacy of the totalitarian and Communist regime, 
as well as clearly aiming toward building contemporary professional intelligence 
services.  The process of reformation of the intelligence community is most certainly 
difficult, but in order to ensure a professional, democratic and transparent intelligence 
services that serve the national interest it is essential to implement the reforms 
recommended in this thesis.  The reforms should provide effective and efficient 
intelligence services ready to face new threats such as organized crime, corruption, and 
international terrorism, all the while adhering to the implementation of democratic and 
internationally recognized obligations in the conduct of the intelligence services.  
Furthermore, it will surely help speed up the process of integrating Albania into NATO 
and the EU. 
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